Kollel Iyun Hadaf Insights to the Daf: Sotah 21-25
Insights to the Daf: Sotah 21-25
INSIGHTS INTO THE
DAILY DAF
DAILY DAF
prepared by Kollel Iyun Hadaf
of Yerushalayim
Rosh Kollel: Rabbi Mordecai Kornfeld
1) THE PROTECTIVE QUALITIES OF LEARNING TORAH AND PERFORMING MITZVOS
QUESTION:
The Beraisa explains that the merit of a Mitzvah is compared to
candlelight, and the merit of learning Torah is compared to daylight.
Just as candlelight provides only a temporary protection from the
dangers of the dark, a Mitzvah protects a person only temporarily. The
merit of learning Torah, on the other hand, is like daylight; just as
daylight is a permanent form of protection (for the sun consistently
rises each day), the Torah is a permanent form of protection for a
person.
In
the Gemara's conclusion, Rava explains that both Torah and Mitzvos
protect a person from Yisurin, physical afflictions in this world, both
during the time he is involved in them (learning Torah or performing a
Mitzvah) and afterwards. The Torah has the additional property that
during the time a person is learning, it also protects him from the
Yetzer ha'Ra (that is, it affords spiritual protection as well as
physical protection).
The
Gemara's conclusion seems to contradict the statement of the Beraisa.
The Beraisa says that the difference between the merit of Torah and the
merit of a Mitzvah is that the merit of Torah provides a more permanent
form of protection. According to Rava, however, both the Torah and a
Mitzvah offer protection from Yisurin even when a person is not involved
with them. Only with regard to protection from the Yetzer ha'Ra do the
two differ: a Mitzvah does not provide any protection, while the Torah does.
With
regard to what form of danger does the Beraisa state that a Mitzvah
provides protection but its protection is less than that provided by the
Torah? (TOSFOS DH Mitzvah)
ANSWERS:
(a) The MAHARSHA
answers that a Mitzvah's protection exists only in Olam ha'Zeh, this
world. The Torah, in contrast, provides protection for the Neshamah even
after the person leaves this world. It protects the Neshamah from the
Yisurin of Din, judgement, in Olam ha'Ba. (See Chagigah 27a: "The fire
of Gehinom has no power over those who learn Torah"; see also Chagigah
15b, and RASHASH and NETZIV here.) In this sense the protection of the Torah is more permanent than the protection of a Mitzvah.
TOSFOS, however, does not accept this
answer, perhaps because the Beraisa continues and says that there is
another explanation for the difference between Torah and Mitzvos -- that
sin can extinguish the merit of a Mitzvah (l'Asid la'Vo; see Rashi and
Tosfos) but it cannot extinguish the merit of Torah. What does the
Beraisa mean when it says that a sin can extinguish a Mitzvah? If a
person performs a Mitzvah, how can he lose reward for it by doing an
Aveirah? The Beraisa must mean that the reward of the Mitzvah cannot
overpower the necessity for punishment for the Aveirah. Consequently,
the person will be punished for the Aveirah despite the fact that he did
a Mitzvah. With regard to Torah, however, the Torah he learned will
protect him to some extent from punishment for his Aveiros. Since the
"Davar Acher" of the Beraisa expresses this difference between Torah and
Mitzvos, this cannot be the difference expressed by the first part of
the Beraisa. Perhaps the Maharsha understands that the "Davar Acher"
indeed expresses the same idea as the first part of the Beraisa but
merely in different terms. (Tosfos considered this interpretation
improbable and thus did not accept it.)
(b) The CHAFETZ CHAIM in LIKUTEI HALACHOS
explains that there are two ways of learning Torah and doing Mitzvos:
Lishmah and she'Lo Lishmah. Rava, who says that Torah protects a person
from sinning only when he is involved with learning Torah, refers to one
who learns she'Lo Lishmah, such as the Torah-learning of Doeg
(Sanhedrin 106a). However, when a person learns Torah or does Mitzvos Lishmah,
the Torah protects him from the Yetzer ha'Ra even while he is not
involved in learning Torah, and Mitzvos protect him from the Yetzer
ha'Ra when he is involved in their performance.
The OR HA'CHAIM HA'KADOSH
(Vayikra 26:3:7) uses this approach to defend the view of Rav Yosef who
suggests that the Torah protects a person from the Yetzer ha'Ra even
when he is not learning. The Gemara rejects Rav Yosef's view on the
grounds that if the Torah protects a person from sinning, how was it
possible that Doeg and Achitofel, who learned Torah, succumbed to sin?
The Or ha'Chaim answers that Doeg and Achitofel learned Torah she'Lo Lishmah
and that is why their Torah did not protect them while they were not
learning. When Rav Yosef explains that Torah protects a person even when
he is not learning, he is discussing one who learns Torah Lishmah.
(Tosfos may not accept this approach because of this very reason;
according to the Chafetz Chaim, Rava's rejection of Rav Yosef's
explanation of the Beraisa is not justified. The Chafetz Chaim may
understand that a woman who learns Torah is comparable to a man who
learns Torah she'Lo Lishmah, since she has no obligation of Talmud
Torah. That is why Rava, who is discussing the Torah and Mitzvos of a
woman, refer to Torah and Mitzvos she'Lo Lishmah.)
(c) TOSFOS
later in the Sugya asks another question. Rav Yosef says that if
Achitofel would have realized that the merit of Torah study protects a
person from harm, he would not have attempted to harm David ha'Melech.
The reason why Achitofel thought he could overpower David ha'Melech was
that he suspected that David ha'Melech was involved with the sin of
Eshes Ish, and the Torah says that such an act causes the Shechinah to
depart from the person and leave him unprotected. Achitofel did not
realize that David's Torah-learning would protect him even from such an
Aveirah. Tosfos (DH v'Hen) asks that the Gemara earlier says that both
Torah and Mitzvos can protect a person from punishment, even while he is
not involved in them. Why, then, does Rav Yosef imply that it was the
unique merit of Torah that was able to protect David ha'Melech?
To
answer these questions, it is necessary to address another question. The
Gemara in Berachos (19a) teaches that if one sees a Talmid Chacham
transgress an Aveirah at night, he must assume that by the next morning
the Talmid Chacham has already repented for his sin. Why, then, did
Achitofel assume that he could overpower David ha'Melech, if he knew
that David ha'Melech presumably repented for his sin? The answer is that
the Mishnah at the end of Yoma (85b) teaches that Teshuvah alone does
not suffice to atone for all sins. If a person commits the type of sin
that involves Kares or Misas Beis Din, he must first undergo Yisurin
(afflictions) in order to gain atonement. If a person commits the type
of sin that involves Chilul Hash-m (because the sin is publicized), he
does not achieve full atonement until death. Achitofel relied on the
fact that David ha'Melech would have to suffer Yisurin and death first
in order to gain atonement, and therefore he reasoned that he would be
successful in joining Avshalom to vanquish David ha'Melech.
There
are two different types of tragedy which may befall a person, Chas
v'Shalom. The first type is a tragedy which befalls a person because of
natural circumstances (his "Mazal"). The second type is a tragedy one
faces as a direct result of his sins ("Yisurin Mechaprin"). When the
Beraisa states that Torah and Mitzvos protect a person from evil even
when he is not involved in Torah and Mitzvos at the moment, it might
refer to natural evils which befall him because of his "Mazal." However,
when a person is destined to suffer punishment because of his sins, the
Mitzvos he performs cannot protect him from punishment since it has
been decreed that he must suffer to atone for his sons. Learning Torah,
however, can take the place of physical suffering and even death,
because the exertion involved in toiling in Torah is equivalent to
physical affliction and even death. (See Tamid 32a, Berachos 63b,
Shabbos 88a, and Midrash Tanchuma, beginning of Parshas Noach).
This
explains why only Torah was able to protect David ha'Melech. David
ha'Melech was deserving of Yisurin to atone for his sins, and only Torah
could provide that degree of Yisurin for his atonement.
This
also explains Rava's statement. Rava says that the merit of a Mitzvah
protects a person permanently, even when he is not involved with the
Mitzvah, but it protects him only from natural circumstances. If the
person is deserving of punishment and needs Yisurin to atone for his
sins, only Torah can provide him with protection. The Beraisa, which
compares the Torah to daylight which affords more permanent protection,
refers to protection from Yisurin due to Aveiros.
Why
does Rava explain that the merit of a Mitzvah can protect a woman from
the effects of the Mei Sotah? The Mei Sotah serves to punish her for the
sin of adultery, but a Mitzvah cannot protect a person from Yisurin
that come for atonement for a sin! The answer is that the punishment
that comes from drinking the Mei Sotah is not the same as an ordinary
punishment of Misas Beis Din which Beis Din administers in order to
punish a wrongdoer and enable him to atone for his sins. Rather, the Mei
Sotah proves whether or not she is permitted to her husband by the
"natural" element of cause and effect which Hash-m put into the world,
wherein a sinner's body reacts to the sanctity of the holy Name mixed
with the waters of the Kiyor and the dirt from the floor of the Beis
ha'Mikdash. The merit of a Mitzvah is able to protect the woman from
this "natural" calamity even though it cannot protect her from the
Yisurin which she must suffer eventually due to her sins. (M. Kornfeld)
Sotah 22
1) THE REWARD FOR WALKING TO SHUL
QUESTION:
The Gemara teaches that when there are two synagogues in one's
vicinity, he receives "Sechar Pesi'os" for walking to the synagogue
which is farther away. RASHI explains
that this Gemara teaches that when a person exerts himself more than
necessary in order to do a Mitzvah, he acquires more reward for the
Mitzvah (see Avos 5:23, "l'Fum Tza'ara Agra").
Although
the importance of exerting oneself for a Mitzvah may be derived from
the words of the Gemara here, the Gemara expresses this principle only
with regard to exerting oneself by traveling a longer distance to reach a
Beis ha'Keneses. (The Gemara does not say, for example, that one
performs a greater Mitzvah when he walks a longer distance to perform
the Mitzvah of sitting in a Sukah.) Is there any reason for why walking
to a Beis ha'Keneses is unique in this respect?
ANSWERS:
(a)
Perhaps there is a special Mitzvah to travel to the Beis ha'Keneses
because the Beis ha'Keneses is called a "Mikdash Me'at" (Megilah 29a;
see also Bava Metzia 28b), and the Torah gives a Mitzvah to travel to
the Beis ha'Mikdash during the Regel. The same Mitzvah to travel to the
Beis ha'Mikdash applies to traveling to the "Mikdash Me'at," the Beis
ha'Keneses.
(b)
The objective of prayer is to bring oneself closer to Hash-m and to
lessen the distance between Hash-m and oneself, so to speak (see Sotah
5a). Traveling a distance towards the synagogue symbolizes that one is
exerting himself to lessen the distance between Hash-m and him.
Therefore, it is an appropriate preface to prayer. (This may also be one
of the themes of Aliyah l'Regel.) (MAHARAL in NESIVOS OLAM, Nesiv ha'Avodah 5)
2) AGADAH: A WRONGFUL ACT OF A TALMID CHACHAM
The
Gemara teaches that a Talmid Chacham can become liable for death for
either passing Halachic rulings when he is not yet of age, or for not
passing Halachic rulings when he is of age.
Based on this Gemara, the VILNA GA'ON
(Kol Eliyahu #64) offers a fascinating explanation for why the phrase
"Lo Tirtzach" in the Aseres ha'Dibros (Shemos 20:13) is pronounced in
two different ways. When the Torah is read with the Ta'am ha'Tachton,
the sub-lineal cantillational notes, the word "Tirtzach" is in the
middle of a verse and is pronounced with the vowelization of a "Patach"
beneath the letter Tzadi. When the Torah is read with the Ta'am
ha'Elyon, the super-lineal cantillational notes, the word is pronounced
with the vowelization of a "Kamatz" since it is read as the end of the
verse, and thus it is pronounced "Tirtzoch."
The
Vilna Ga'on explains that the verse alludes to the two sins for which a
Talmid Chacham is punished with death. By transgressing one of these two
sins, a Talmid Chacham also commits "murder" ("Tirtzach") because he
brings about his own death (or because he brings about the death of the
people of his generation, as RASHI in
Avodah Zarah (19b) writes). The first sin is that the Talmid Chacham
opens ("Patach") his mouth and renders Halachic rulings when he is not
supposed to do so, and the other sin is that he closes ("Kamatz," as in
"Kamtzan") his mouth when he is supposed to open it and render Halachic
rulings!
22b----------------------------------------22b
3) DOING MITZVOS "SHE'LO LISHMAH"
QUESTION:
The Gemara describes seven types of undesirable Perushim. Among them
are, "Parush Shichmi," "Parush me'Ahavah," and "Parush me'Yir'ah." RASHI
explains that "Parush Shichmi" refers to a person who performs Mitzvos
like the people of Shechem, who circumcised themselves to gain honor and
not l'Shem Shamayim. (The Yerushalmi explains that "Parush Shichmi"
refers to a person who carries his Mitzvos on his "shoulder" ("Shechem")
in order to flaunt them publicly.) "Parush me'Ahavah" and "Parush
me'Yir'ah" refer to people who act devoutly out of their desire for
reward for performing the Mitzvos, or out of their desire to avoid
punishment for transgressing the Mitzvos, and they do not do the Mitzvos
out of love for Hash-m.
Abaye
and Rava state that the Tana should omit the last two Perushim, because
they are not derogatory types of Perushim. Rav teaches that a person should
learn Torah and do Mitzvos even she'Lo Lishmah because such acts will
bring him to do them Lishmah. The Gemara in Nazir (23b) adds that Rav
cites support for this from the fact that Balak sacrificed 42 Korbanos
only in order to appease Hash-m to destroy the Jewish people, and yet he
merited to have Ruth as a granddaughter who fulfilled the Mitzvos
Lishmah (see Insights to Nazir 23:3-4).
Why
does Abaye not state that the Tana should also omit "Parush Shichmi"
from his list? A "Parush Shichmi" is also one who does Mitzvos she'Lo
Lishmah, and he, too, will eventually merit to do them Lishmah.
ANSWERS:
(a) The MAHARSHA
explains that when the people of Shechem performed Milah, everyone who
saw them knew that they performed the act for their own personal gain
and not Lishmah. Therefore, their act was not on the same level as one
who does a Mitzvah in a way that only he knows that he is doing it for
personal gain and not Lishmah. The she'Lo Lishmah of Shechem is indeed a
derogatory form of Lo Lishmah.
However,
this approach does not seem consistent with the proof that Rav cites
from Balak. In his case, it certainly was clear to everyone that Balak
was bringing his Korbanos only out of his desire for personal gain, and
yet Rav says that Balak's act is the source that one who does a Mitzvah
she'Lo Lishmah will eventually do it Lishmah.
(b) RAV ELYASHIV shlit'a (quoted in HE'OROS B'MASECHES SOTAH)
explains that although a person who performs Mitzvos -- which he is
obligated to do -- she'Lo Lishmah is doing something positive, a person
who is not obligated to do a certain Mitzvah but chooses to do it for personal gain is not
acting properly. He should refrain from doing the Mitzvah altogether
rather than do it she'Lo Lishmah. The people in Shechem were not
obligated to perform Milah, and therefore when they performed the
Mitzvah she'Lo Lishmah they acted improperly. Similarly, a person who
wears Tefilin all day only in order to gain the respect of others does
not act properly.
This
might explain why Rashi (DH Ma'aseh Shechem) writes that this Parush
performs "his acts" ("Ma'asav") for his own benefit, and he does not
write that this Parush performs "Mitzvos" for his own benefit.
However,
this approach also does not seem consistent with the proof from Balak
who offered Korbanos she'Lo Lishmah. How can Rav prove from Balak that
"Mitoch she'Lo Lishmah, Ba Lishmah," if Balak was not obligated to offer
Korbanos?
(c)
Rav states that a person should do Mitzvos even she'Lo Lishmah because
doing Mitzvos she'Lo Lishmah brings a person to do them Lishmah. To whom
does Rav address his statement? Does he address the person who does not
want to do Mitzvos at all, or does he address the person who wants to
do Mitzvos Lishmah? He obviously is not addressing a person who wants to
do Mitzvos Lishmah, because he would not tell that person to do the
Mitzvos she'Lo Lishmah. Rather, Rav must be addressing a person who is
ready to refrain from doing a Mitzvah because he knows he cannot do it
Lishmah. Rav tells him that he should do the Mitzvah in any case,
because by doing it she'Lo Lishmah he will merit to do it Lishmah. The
person to whom Rav addresses his statement clearly does not intend to do
the Mitzvah for personal gain, because such a person would not consider
refraining from doing the Mitzvah due to his lack of ability to do it
Lishmah.
Rather,
Rav is addressing a person who wants to do Mitzvos Lishmah but he has
difficulty recognizing the loftiness of Hash-m and arousing in himself a
love for Hash-m. The person wants to do the will of Hash-m, but he
considers refraining from doing the Mitzvah because he reasons that if
he performs the Mitzvah, he will not do it in the proper manner and
Hash-m will be displeased with him. Rav tells such a person that even if
his only reason to do the Mitzvah is to avoid the wrath of Hash-m, it
is better than not doing the Mitzvah at all. Through such performance of
the Mitzvah he will merit to perform Mitzvos out of love for Hash-m.
Rav proves from Balak that a person who does Mitzvos she'Lo Lishmah
merits to do Mitzvos Lishmah.
According
to this approach, perhaps Rav advises a person to perform a Mitzvah
she'Lo Lishmah only in the circumstances mentioned above because a
person who is not on the proper level of Avodas Hash-m is unable to
arouse in himself the love of Hash-m until he performs Mitzvos, and
through the performance of Mitzvos he comes to do them Lishmah. However,
if a person wants to do Mitzvos for personal gain, Rav would tell him
to refrain from doing Mitzvos, since the person should do Mitzvos simply
because he is obligated by the Torah to do them and he does not need to
do them in a way that brings him personal gain. If he is not bound by
the Torah, he should avoid doing them entirely.
The
proof Rav cites from Balak is that any she'Lo Lishmah performance of a
Mitzvah can lead to Lishmah, even the worst she'Lo Lishmah (for personal
gain). However, there is no need to advise a person to do Mitzvos in
such a manner (to gain honor or monetary benefit in this world), since
he could just as well do the Mitzvah for the reward in the World to
Come. Nothing stops him from doing the Mitzvah for reward in the World
to Come.
For this reason, Abaye says that the last two Perushim should be omitted from the list. Rav teaches that it is
advisable to serve Hash-m in such a Lo Lishmah manner. However, doing
Mitzvos in the manner of the "Parush Shichmi" is never an advisable
manner in which to serve Hash-m, even if it may lead one to do Mitzvos
Lishmah.
This explanation also supports the explanations of the Maharsha and Rav Elyashiv in He'oros b'Maseches Sotah. (M. Kornfeld)
Sotah 23
1) A FATHER WHO MAKES HIS SON A NAZIR
QUESTION:
The Mishnah lists a number of Halachic differences between a man and a
woman. One of those differences is that a man may obligate his minor son
(Katan) to observe an oath of Nezirus, while a woman may not.
What
significance is there to the Nezirus of a minor? Since the Torah does
not obligate a Katan to observe the Mitzvos, why does the Torah require
that he observe the Nezirus which his father accepted on his behalf?
(a) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Nezirus 2:13) explains that the obligations of this Nezirus apply to the father.
The father must treat his son like a Nazir by keeping him away from
wine, haircuts, and Tum'ah. This also appears to be the intention of the
ROSH (Nazir 28b) who writes that the father must bring all of the Korbanos for the Nezirus of his son.
(b) RASHI (DH ha'Ish; see also BARTENURA
here) writes that when the father accepts an oath of Nezirus on behalf
of his son, his son remains a Nazir even if he reaches adulthood during
the period of the Nezirus. Perhaps Rashi finds it necessary to mention
this point here in order to explain the relevance of the Nezirus to the
son. Rashi explains that even the child himself, and not just the
father, is affected by the Nezirus because -- if he becomes an adult and
becomes obligated in Mitzvos during the Nezirus -- he will become
obligated mid'Oraisa to observe all of the laws of Nezirus as a result
of the Nezirus which took effect while he was a Katan. (Although Mitzvos
do not apply to a Katan, a change of status, like the status of Nazir,
does apply to a Katan, such as the status of Tum'ah and Taharah.)
RASHI in Makos (22a, DH Nazir Shimshon) and the MEFARESH
in Nazir (30a, DH Ka'im, and DH Hachi Garsinan) also imply that if the
father makes his son a Nazir, the Nezirus remains in force even after
the son becomes an adult.
However, TOSFOS in Nazir (28b, DH v'Ein) and the ROSH
and other Rishonim (ibid.) cite a Tosefta (Nazir 3:9) which clearly
states that just as Macha'ah (protest of the son or other relative) ends
the son's Nezirus and prevents him from bringing the Korbanos of a
Nazir, so, too, adulthood (the growth of two Se'aros) ends his Nezirus
and prevents him from bringing the Korbanos of a Nazir. This is clear as
well from the Gemara in Nazir (beginning of 30a) which, according to
these Rishonim, bases its question on the fact that once the son reaches
adulthood, the Nezirus which his father accepted for him is no longer
valid (and he must make himself a Nazir if he wants to observe a full
Nezirus).
How
does Rashi understand the Tosefta? Perhaps Rashi maintains that when a
son reaches adulthood after his father made him a Nazir, although he
must observe his Nezirus he does not bring the Korbanos at the
conclusion of the Nezirus. This is because the Korbanos are part of the
obligation which a person accepts when he makes an oath of Nezirus (see
Nedarim 4a). Since the father accepted the obligation of the Nezirus on
behalf of his son, it becomes the father's obligation to bring
Korbanos. When his son reaches adulthood (and is no longer in his
father's domain), he does not acquire the obligation of Korbanos from
his father, but the father is also not obligated to bring the Korbanos
because his son has left his domain. The Tosefta means only that the
Nezirus of the son is no longer applicable with regard to its Korbanos.
Therefore, the laws of the Mishnah apply to a son who reaches adulthood
after his father made him a Nazir (for example, if his father set aside
for him an animal before he became an adult, it is a Chatas Mesah).
The
Gemara in Nazir (beginning of 30a) also might mean that since the son
does not bring Korbanos when he reaches adulthood, he is not bound by
all of the laws of Nezirus. (This also answers the questions of the KEREN ORAH on the Mefaresh there.) (See also Insights to Nazir 28:1.)
2) HALACHIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN A MAN AND A WOMAN
QUESTION:
The Mishnah lists a number of Halachic differences between a man and a
woman. The Mishnah, however, omits a number of important differences.
Why does the Mishnah not mention that a woman is not obligated to
fulfill time-related Mitzvos (Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama), or that a
woman is not bound by the Lavim of Hakafah and Gilu'ach (shaving the
head and shaving the beard), as the Mishnah in Kidushin (29a) mentions?
Also, why does the Mishnah here not mention the Mitzvos of Talmud Torah,
Piryah v'Rivyah, and Pidyon ha'Ben, from which a woman is exempt
(Kidushin 34b), and the Mitzvos which only a father is responsible to do
for his child, such as Milah (Kidushin 29a)?
The Tosefta (2:8) cited by TOSFOS
(23b, DH Mah) indeed adds to the Mishnah's list the difference of
Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama, Hakafah, and Gilu'ach. However, even
the Tosefta omits Talmud Torah, Piryah v'Rivyah, Pidyon ha'Ben, and
Milah. Why does it omit these Mitzvos?
ANSWER: Apparently, the intent of the Mishnah is to list only ways in which men and women differ with regard to the details
of Mitzvos, but not with regard to their obligations to observe Mitzvos
in general. The Mishnah lists the differences between men and women
with regard to details of Mitzvos such as the procedure required by a
woman who is a Metzora or a woman who is a Nezirah, the status of a son
whose mother attempts to make him a Nazir, how a woman is punished with
Sekilah, and how she is treated if she steals. The Mishnah mentions only
these differences because they are related to the Mishnah's discussion
about the how to sacrifice the Minchah offering of a Kohen. The Mishnah
says that when a Kohen donates a Minchah, there is a difference between
the way the Minchah is offered when donated by a male Kohen and when
donated by a female Kohenes. This difference is not a general difference
between the Kohen and Kohenes. In contrast, all of the Mitzvos omitted
by the Mishnah are general obligations and not matters of details about a
Mitzvah.
The Tosefta, in contrast, discusses general obligations of a man and woman.
If
the Tosefta discusses differences that relate to the general obligations
of a man and woman, why does the Tosefta omit the Mitzvos of Talmud
Torah, Piryah v'Rivyah, Pidyon ha'Ben, and Milah?
The answer may be inherent in the wording of the Tosefta. The Tosefta says that a woman "may transgress a Mitzvas Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama, and not a man." The Tosefta lists only Mitzvos which one may transgress
(such as the Isur of Hakafah and Gilu'ach, and missing the time to do
the Mitzvah in the case of a Mitzvas Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama), but not
Mitzvos which are not limited to a particular time (such as Talmud
Torah, Piryah v'Rivyah, and Pidyon ha'Ben) and thus it is not possible
to discuss "transgressing" them.
Perhaps
the reason why the Tosefta lists only Mitzvos which one can transgress
is that only in those cases is there a difference in the details of the
Mitzvah for a man and for a woman. That is, in Mitzvos that are
"transgressable" there is a difference between a man and woman with
regard to whether the transgressor is punished with Malkus d'Oraisa or
Malkus d'Rabanan. The Tosefta lists these Mitzvos Aseh not
because of the difference in their obligation or exemption, but because
of the differences in the details for a person who violates them. In
contrast, the only difference between a man and a woman with regard to
the Mitzvos of Talmud Torah, Piryah v'Rivyah, Pidyon ha'Ben, and Milah
is the obligation itself, and not the details of the obligation, or the outcome (such as the punishment) of the obligation.
Sotah 24
1) MAY A "SHOMERES YAVAM" AND AN "ARUSAH" DRINK THE "MEI SOTAH"?
QUESTION:
The Gemara records a dispute between Rebbi Yonasan and Rebbi Yoshiyah
with regard to whether a Shomeres Yavam may drink the Mei Sotah. They
agree that an Arusah may not drink the Mei Sotah, and they agree
that the Yavam's Kinuy is effective to cause the Shomeres Yavam to lose
her Kesuvah (and to prohibit her to the Yavam; see Rashi 23b, DH v'Lo
Notlos). The Mishnah (23b) follows the opinion of Rebbi Yonasan who says
that a Shomeres Yavam, like an Arusah, does not drink the Mei Sotah.
How
is the view of Rebbi Yonasan and the Mishnah here to be reconciled with
the Mishnah earlier (18b) which states that when the woman is given the
Mei Sotah to drink, she must affirm an oath that not only did she not
sin while married (during Nisu'in), but that she also did not sin while
she was an Arusah or a Shomeres Yavam? The Mishnah there clearly implies
that a woman does drink the Mei Sotah when her husband (or Yavam) accuses her of infidelity while she is a Shomeres Yavam or Arusah.
ANSWERS: The Gemara in Yevamos (58b) and Kidushin (27b) asks this question and offers three answers.
(a)
The Gemara in Kidushin (27b) explains that the Mishnah earlier in Sotah
(18b) does not refer to a case in which a man gives his wife the Mei
Sotah to drink because of a Kinuy and Setirah which occur while she is a
Shomeres Yavam or an Arusah. Rather, it refers to a case in which he
gives his wife the Mei Sotah to drink because of a Kinuy and Setirah
which occur after Nisu'in. The Mishnah teaches that once she is
obligated to drink the Mei Sotah for a Kinuy and Setirah which occur
after Nisu'in, she is required to swear that not only did she not sin
during the Setirah for which she is accused, but that she also did not
sin at any other time of her marriage, such as when she was an Arusah or
Shomeres Yavam. The Gemara states there that this Mishnah is the source
for the concept of "Gilgul Shevu'ah."
This
seems to be the approach of the Gemara in Sotah (19b) as well. The
Gemara infers from the Mishnah that a Shomeres Yavam who sinned with
another man is prohibited to marry the Yavam from the fact that the
Mishnah says that an additional clause is appended to the Shevu'ah
("Gilgul") only for the type of sin that would make her prohibited to
her husband. The Gemara clearly understands the Mishnah in its most
literal sense -- that the case of Shomeres Yavam in the Mishnah refers
to an ordinary case of a Yevamah who is waiting to perform Yibum.
This is also the approach of Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak in Yevamos (58b; see Insights to Yevamos 58:1).
(b)
However, Rav Sheshes and Rav Papa in Yevamos (58b) avoid this approach.
Apparently, they find this approach unsatisfactory because it leads to
one of two conclusions: it either supports the view of Rav Hamnuna that a
Shomeres Yavam who sinned is prohibited to the Yavam, or it supports
the view of Rebbi Akiva that Chayavei Lavim have the same status as
Chayavei Kerisus and therefore a Shomeres Yavam who sinned is prohibited
to the Yavam in the same way that an Eshes Ish who sinned is prohibited
to her husband (as the Gemara says earlier in Sotah, 18b). The problem
is that the Gemara itself rules against both of these opinions. It rules
against Rav Hamnuna's opinion earlier in Sotah (18b; see, however,
Tosfos there, DH Amrei, who rules contrary to the Gemara's conclusion),
and it rules against Rebbi Akiva in Yevamos (49a).
Therefore,
Rav Sheshes and Rav Papa suggest that the Mishnah (18b) does not refer
to the case of "Gilgul Shevu'ah," but rather it refers to a case of
Kinuy of a woman who is actually a Shomeres Yavam or an Arusah. Why is
such a woman given the Mei Sotah to drink? Rav Papa in Yevamos suggests
that the Mishnah means that the husband performed Kinuy while she was a
Shomeres Yavam or Arusah, and the woman was Nisterah with the other man after
she did Yibum or became married. The Kinuy performed when she was a
Shomeres Yavam or Arusah is effective, as the Gemara here says. It is
only the Setirah which must occur after she is fully married in
order to obligate her to drink the Mei Sotah. (This is one way Rashi
explains Rav Papa's answer in Yevamos. However, Rashi himself points out
that this answer is tenuous because if the Setirah occurred after she
was married, the Mishnah should not say that she "became a Sotah" while
she was a Shomeres Yavam or Arusah. Rashi therefore offers another
explanation there for Rav Papa's answer; see (c) below.)
(c) The Gemara in Yevamos suggests further that the Mishnah in Sotah (18b) means that an Arusah -- who had Kinuy and
Setirah while she was an Arusah -- could be required to drink the Mei
Sotah later, after she becomes married (as the Gemara here (25a)
mentions).
However,
this suggestion raises a new problem. If she was Nisterah while she was
an Arusah, before the Nisu'in, the Shechivas ha'Bo'el (the sin with the
adulterer) occurred before the husband lived with her. One of the prerequisites for giving the woman the Mei Sotah is that the Shechivas ha'Ba'al
(relations with the husband) must precede the Shechivas ha'Bo'el. Why,
then, should an Arusah be required to drink the Mei Sotah?
The
Gemara in Yevamos answers (as it answers here in Sotah) that the Mishnah
must be referring to a case in which the husband had relations with her
before he married her ("b'Beis Chamihah"). However, this answer
suffices to explain only why an Arusah drinks the Mei Sotah. An
Arusah can become a Nesu'ah after the Setirah through Chupah (without
Bi'ah with her husband), and thus she fulfills the requirement of
"Menukah me'Avon." (In order to drink the Mei Sotah, the husband and the
accused woman may not have relations after the Setirah.) This answer
does not suffice to explain why a Shomeres Yavam drinks the Mei
Sotah. If a Shomeres Yavam underwent Kinuy and Setirah before she did
Yibum, there is no possible way for the Yavam to marry her and still
remain "Menukeh me'Avon," since the only way to marry a Yevamah is
through an act of Bi'ah of Yibum. Moreover, there is no way to fulfill
the requirement that the Shechivas ha'Ba'al precede the Shechivas
ha'Bo'el; how can the Yavam have relations with the Shomeres Yavam
before the adulterer does? If he has relations with her, she will no
longer be a Shomeres Yavam at the time of the Setirah, because by having
relations with her he thereby consummates the marriage!
The Gemara in Yevamos suggests a number of answers to this question.
1.
The Mishnah refers to a case in which the Yavam had relations with the
Shomeres Yavam against her will, prior to the Setirah. Since the act of
Bi'ah was against her will, it is not fully effective. Therefore, she is
still considered a Shomeres Yavam (according to the view of Shmuel, who
rules that an act of Bi'ah against her will is not Koneh her with
regard to Terumah), and yet she is able to drink the Mei Sotah since the
Yavam had relations with her (according to the view of Rebbi Yoshiyah,
who rules that a Shomeres Yavam after Bi'ah against her will does drink the Mei Sotah, in contrast to the Mishnah on 23b).
2.
The Gemara suggests further that the Mishnah follows the opinion of
Beis Shamai who says that Ma'amar is Koneh a Shomeres Yavam, and --
after Ma'amar -- Bi'ah can no longer be Koneh her without Chupah (see
Yevamos 29b, where the Gemara is in doubt about this point). In this
case, the Yavam lived with her after Ma'amar, after which the adulterer
was Nisterah with her.
3. RASHI in Yevamos suggests another explanation for the Gemara there, according to which the Gemara answers that it indeed is not necessary for the Yavam himself to live with the Yevamah before the adulterer. The Bi'ah which the original
brother did with his wife (before he died) suffices to fulfill the
condition that the "husband's Bi'ah precede the adulterer's," as the
Yavam merely takes the place of his deceased brother.
One
problem remains, however. Why does the Shomeres Yavam drink the Mei
Sotah at all, if Rebbi Yonasan rules that a Shomeres Yavam does not
drink the Mei Sotah? The Gemara could have answered that the Mishnah
follows the opinion of Rebbi Yoshiyah that a Shomeres Yavam does
drink the Mei Sotah. However, the Gemara answers that the Mishnah may
follow even the opinion of Rebbi Yonasan, if it rules like Beis Shamai
who says that Ma'amar is Koneh the Yevamah, and if Rebbi Yonasan agrees
that after Ma'amar the Yevamah may drink the Mei Sotah. (Alternatively,
the Mishnah may follow the opinion of Rebbi Yonasan if it rules like
Shmuel who says that Bi'ah against her will is not Koneh the Yevamah for
all matters, and if Rebbi Yonasan agrees that it is Koneh her with regard to drinking the Mei Sotah.)
Why,
though, does Rashi write that the Bi'ah of the deceased brother is
considered to be the Shechivas ha'Ba'al which precedes the Shechivas
ha'Bo'el? This clearly contradicts the Gemara here (see TOSFOS
to 58a, DH d'Kavasah). The answer is that Rashi understands that the
dispute between the Sugyos with regard to whether the Mishnah (18b) is
discussing a case of "Gilgul Shevu'ah" or an ordinary case of Kinuy
revolves around this point. The Gemara in Yevamos maintains that the
Mishnah is discussing an ordinary case of Kinuy, because it understands
that the Bi'ah of the deceased husband is considered Shechivas ha'Ba'al.
Accordingly, the Mishnah refers to the Kinuy of a Shomeres Yavam (as in
(3) above). The Gemara here, however, and in Kidushin understands that
the deceased husband's Bi'ah does not qualify as the Shechivas ha'Ba'al,
and therefore the Gemara cannot explain that the Mishnah refers to an
ordinary case of Kinuy while the woman was a Shomeres Yavam, since the
requirement that the Shechivas ha'Ba'al precede the Shechivas ha'Bo'el
cannot be fulfilled. Therefore, the Gemara must explain that the Mishnah
discusses a case of "Gilgul Shevu'ah."
Sotah 25
1) THE HUSBAND'S "MECHILAH" OF HIS "KINUY"
QUESTION:
The Gemara says that the husband may forgo his Kinuy and prevent his
wife from becoming prohibited to him through Setirah with the suspected
adulterer after the Kinuy. The Mechilah of the Kinuy renders the Setirah
nothing more than a transgression of the Isur of Yichud, which does not
prohibit her to her husband since she has a Chezkas Kashrus that she is
innocent of sin.
One
Amora maintains that the husband may forgo the Kinuy even after his wife
did Setirah and thereby permit her to him retroactively. How does the
husband's Mechilah of his Kinuy permit his wife after the Setirah? The
reason why the woman becomes prohibited to him when she did Setirah
after Kinuy (as opposed to Setirah without Kinuy) is the logical
argument of "Raglayim l'Davar" (Nidah 3a): since the husband warned her
not to seclude herself with this man and informed her of the
consequences, she would not have secluded herself with him unless she
had a strong Yetzer ha'Ra to sin with him, and thus it may be assumed
that she sinned.
The
Mechilah of the Kinuy does not remove this logical argument. She still
should be prohibited to her husband because of "Raglayim l'Davar" that
she sinned. (REBBI AKIVA EIGER)
ANSWERS:
(a) RABEINU CHAIM HA'LEVI
answers that "Raglayim l'Davar" alone does not suffice to prohibit a
Sotah to her husband. The Chezkas Kashrus would overpower even the
"Raglayim l'Davar" and permit her if not for the special Gezeiras
ha'Kasuv which teaches that when a woman is Nisterah after Kinuy, she
becomes prohibited to her husband. Therefore, when the husband forgoes
the Kinuy, the woman is no longer prohibited to him. (See Insights to Sotah 18:1.)
(b)
Perhaps the Mechilah of the Kinuy indeed weakens the proof of "Raglayim
l'Davar." The woman may have known that the husband's Mechilah of the
Kinuy is effective, and she may have planned to persuade her husband to
be Mochel the Kinuy and permit her to remain married to him. As a
result, she knew she did not risk very much by secluding herself with
the other man after the Kinuy. She may have felt free to seclude herself
with him without sinning, and therefore there is no "Raglayim l'Davar."
This
situation is comparable to Kinuy done without witnesses, which the
Gemara (2b) implies cannot prohibit to her husband even though both know
that there was a Kinuy. (See the TESHUVOS SHA'AGAS ARYEH,
Hosafah 1.) Why should she be permitted to him if she was Nisterah
after such a Kinuy? She should be prohibited because of "Raglayim
l'Davar" since they both know that there was a Kinuy! The answer is that
she was not afraid to seclude herself after such a Kinuy since she knew
that the consequences would not be so severe, for she could simply deny
that there ever was a Kinuy and no one would be able to disprove her.
(c)
Alternatively, if the husband was Mochel the Kinuy, it is assumed that
he investigated the matter and determined that his wife did not sin with
the other man. This Chazakah is based on the assumption that a husband
normally does not desire to return to an unfaithful wife. The fact that
he was Mochel the Kinuy and wants to return to her indicates that he
investigated the matter and found her innocent. (This Chazakah is
similar to the Chazakah of "Ishah Daika u'Minseva" (Yevamos 25a), which
states that when a woman remarries based on the testimony of a single
witness who says that her first husband died, it is assumed that she
remarries only after she has thoroughly investigated the matter and
knows that the witness is telling the truth.)
This
Chazakah offsets the proof of "Raglayim l'Davar" which states that she
sinned, and therefore she is permitted to her husband. (M. Kornfeld)
Please Mr. Netanyahu, Mr. Ben Gvir, Mr. Smotrich and Mr. Gallant unite and bring Hashem’s Righteousness back to the Har HaBayit? |
תחת צדקת השם הר הבית יהפוך לבית תפילה לכל העמים: יהודים, מוסלמים ונוצרים כשהם מסירים עבודה זרה ואת דוקטרינות השקר שלהם... על ידי ביטול הברית שנכרתה עם השלטונות האיסלאמיים בשנת 67' על הר הבית וכל שאר הבריתות, איסור על כל הפשעים והתועבות שנעשות על ידי הרשות הפלסטינית, חמאס והג'יהאד האסלאמי. והכרזת ריבונות יהודית על כל ארץ ישראל. |
Come let us Pray that Hashem's Righteousness shall 'return' to the Har haBayit and the whole of Eretz Israel. | בוא נתפלל שצדקת ה' 'תשוב' להר הבית ולארץ ישראל כולה. |
Free to study all Jewish Scripture: | חופשי ללמוד את כל כתבי הקודש היהודיים: |
Our Prayer and hope: All the gates to the Har haBayit have to be opened for Jews and non-Jews seven days in the week 24 hours a day. The Jews need to have the freedom to go with Tefillin, Tallit and Torah Scroll up on the Mountain to serve Hashem. And do קידה ('Kidah' prostate, laying down, before Hashem) Everyone showing his/her respect for the Jewish and all other religions. But NOT for the words/deeds/sins spoken against any word of the Torah of Moshe Rabbeinu and the 'real' teachings of the Jewish Rabbis. The Jews must be the guardians of the Har haBayit. |
תפילתנו ותקוותנו: כל שערי הר הבית צריכים להיפתח עבור יהודים ולא-יהודים שבעה ימים בשבוע 24 שעות ביממה. ליהודים צריך להיות חופש ללכת עם תפילין, טלית וספר תורה במעלה ההר כדי לשרת את ה' ולקוד קידה .מתוך הפגנת כבוד ליהודים ולכל הדתות האחרות, אבל לא למילים/למעשים/לחטאים הנאמרים נגד תורת משה רבנו. מלמודי רבנים, היהודים חייבים להיות שומרי הר הבית. |
Let's pray for a death sentence for the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, Hezbollah and for the continuation of the Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria. The Palestinian Authority, Hamas and Hezbollah must disappear. Enough of the hatred from the world (the USA, the European Union, and the UN!) against the Jewish people. |
בואו נתפלל לגזר דין מוות לרשות הפלסטינית, חמאס, חיזבאללה ולמען התיישבות יהודית ביהודה ושומרון. הרשות הפלסטינית, חמאס וחיזבאללה חייבים להעלם. די לשנאה מהעולם (ארה"ב, האיחוד האירופי והאו"ם!) נגד העם היהודי! |
| על היהודים מוטלת המשימה לשנות את הר הבית, ממצבו הקיים, לבית תפילה לכל העמים על פי חוק התורה של משה רבנו. |
Ariel, hopefully your Representee | אריאל, מקווה שהנציג שלך |
Click: If you have Prayer Requests Har HaBait Jewish Sovereign for all Israel I pray as a Jew when I bring your prayers. |
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