Sefaria Gittin 26a The William Davidson Talmud (Koren - Steinsaltz)
Sefaria Gittin 26a The William Davidson Talmud (Koren - Steinsaltz)
Gittin
Talmud
Gittin (plural of “Get,” or writ of divorce) is a tractate in Seder Nashim (“Order of Women,” which addresses family law). Its nine chapters primarily discuss the process of writing and transmitting a get. Also included in the tractate are sections about tikkun ha’olam, or enactments instituted by the sages for the betterment of the world, stories about the destruction of the Temple, and discussions of medical advice.
Composed: Talmudic Babylon (c.450 - c.550 CE)נוצר/נערך: בבל התלמודית (450 - 550 לספירה בקירוב)
Current Version
Aramaic from The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz
Nikud (vocalization) by Dicta - the Israel Center for Text AnalysisRead More
Current Translation
English from The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel SteinsaltzRead More
Source: korenpub.com
Digitization: Sefaria
License: CC-BY-NC
26a
לֹא רָצָה הָאָב – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.
and if the father does not desire it, she is not betrothed. It is therefore evident that according to Rabbi Shimon, there is retroactive clarification when one makes the outcome dependent on the decision of others, as in this case whether or not this betrothal takes effect is dependent on the desire of the father.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בֵּין לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֵּין לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן; לָא שְׁנָא תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת עַצְמוֹ וְלָא שְׁנָא תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת אֲחֵרִים – אִית לְהוּ בְּרֵירָה;
Rava said to Rav Mesharshiyya: Whether according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda or whether according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, it is no different if one makes the outcome dependent on his own decision, and it is no different if one makes it dependent on the decision of others; they both accept the principle of retroactive clarification.
וְהָתָם – כִּדְקָתָנֵי טַעְמָא, אָמְרוּ לוֹ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר: אִי אַתָּה מוֹדֶה שֶׁמָּא יִבָּקַע הַנּוֹד, וְנִמְצָא זֶה שׁוֹתֶה טְבָלִים לְמַפְרֵעַ? אָמַר לָהֶם: לִכְשֶׁיִּבָּקַע.
Rava explains: And there, in the mishna about one who purchases wine from Samaritans, they do not prohibit him from relying on the separation that he will later perform because they do not accept the principle of retroactive clarification. Rather, the reason they do not prohibit him from relying on the separation that he will later perform is as the Tosefta (Demai 8:7) teaches: The Sages said to Rabbi Meir: Don’t you concede that perhaps the wineskin will burst before he manages to separate the teruma, and this person will have been found retroactively to be drinking untithed produce? Rabbi Meir said to them: When it actually bursts, there will be a concern. In any event, from the question that they addressed to Rabbi Meir, it is clear that they would accept the principle of retroactive clarification in this case.
מַתְנִי׳ הַכּוֹתֵב טוֹפְסֵי גִּיטִּין, צָרִיךְ שֶׁיַּנִּיחַ מְקוֹם הָאִישׁ, וּמְקוֹם הָאִשָּׁה, וּמְקוֹם הַזְּמַן.
MISHNA: With regard to a scribe who writes the standard part [tofes] of bills of divorce in advance, so that when one requests a bill of divorce, he will need to add only the details unique to this case, he must leave empty the place in the bill of divorce for the name of the man, and the place for the name of the woman, and the place for the date.
שְׁטָרֵי מִלְוָה – צָרִיךְ שֶׁיַּנִּיחַ מְקוֹם הַמִּלְוָה, מְקוֹם הַלֹּוֶה, מְקוֹם הַמָּעוֹת, מְקוֹם הַזְּמַן.
If a scribe writes the standard part of loan documents, he must leave empty the place of the name of the lender, the place of the name of the borrower, the place of the amount of the money being loaned, and the place of the date.
שְׁטָרֵי מִקָּח – צָרִיךְ שֶׁיַּנִּיחַ מְקוֹם הַלּוֹקֵחַ, וּמְקוֹם הַמּוֹכֵר, מָקוֹם הַמָּעוֹת, מְקוֹם הַשָּׂדֶה, וּמְקוֹם הַזְּמַן; מִפְּנֵי הַתַּקָּנָה.
If the scribe writes the standard part of documents of sale of land, he must leave empty the place for the name of the purchaser, and the place for the name of the seller, the place for the amount of the money for which the land is being purchased, the place for the description of the field that is being purchased, and the place of the date when the sale occurs. This is necessary due to the ordinance, as the Gemara will explain.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה פּוֹסֵל בְּכוּלָּן. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר מַכְשִׁיר בְּכוּלָּן חוּץ מִגִּיטֵּי נָשִׁים, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״וְכָתַב לָהּ״ – לִשְׁמָהּ.
Rabbi Yehuda invalidates all of these documents if their standard parts were written in advance. Rabbi Elazar deems all of them valid except for bills of divorce, as it is stated in the Torah: “And he writes for her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), indicating that he must write the bill of divorce for her sake. Therefore, one may not write even the standard part of the bill of divorce in advance, as that would not qualify as writing the bill of divorce for her sake.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: צָרִיךְ שֶׁיַּנִּיחַ אַף מְקוֹם ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מוּתֶּרֶת לְכׇל אָדָם״; וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: עֵדֵי מְסִירָה כָּרְתִי, וּבָעֵינַן כְּתִיבָה לִשְׁמָהּ.
GEMARA: Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: One writing a bill of divorce in advance must also leave the place on the standard portion of the bill of divorce to write the essential phrase of: You are hereby permitted to marry any man. And the unattributed opinion of the mishna is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says: Witnesses of the transmission of the bill of divorce effect the divorce, and we require the writing of the essential part of the bill of divorce to be for her sake. If one holds the other opinion, that signatory witnesses on the bill of divorce effect the divorce, then the words “And he writes for her” are referring to the signing of the bill of divorce, and the writing itself need not be done for her sake.
וּצְרִיכָא;
The Gemara notes: And it is necessary for Shmuel to mention that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar in this mishna, as well as Rabbi Elazar’s opinion in the previous chapter with regard to the mishnayot that discuss writing a bill of divorce on a surface that is attached to the ground (21b) and the writing of a bill of divorce by a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor (22b).
דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן הָךְ קַמַּיְיתָא, בְּהַהִיא הוּא דְּאִיכָּא לְאוֹקֹמַהּ כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, דְּקָתָנֵי ״אֵין כּוֹתְבִין״ וְקָתָנֵי ״כִּתְבוּ״;
As, if he had taught us that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar only with regard to this first mishna (21b), which discusses writing a bill of divorce on a surface that is attached to the ground, one could have said it is only that mishna that can be interpreted in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, as that mishna teaches: One may not write a bill of divorce on anything that is attached to the ground, and it teaches in the next clause: If one wrote it on something that is attached to the ground; and there the Gemara proves from the comparison between these two clauses that the mishna must be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar.
אֲבָל סֵיפָא, דְּקָתָנֵי ״שֶׁאֵין קִיּוּם הַגֵּט אֶלָּא בְּחוֹתְמָיו״, אֵימָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: עֵדֵי חֲתִימָה כָּרְתִי.
However, in the latter clause of the next mishna (22b), which teaches that the reason a bill of divorce may be written by a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor is that the ratification of a bill of divorce is only through its signatories, one could say that this is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said: Signatory witnesses on the bill of divorce effect the divorce, and the mishna is discussing a case where the entire bill of divorce was written by the deaf-mute, imbecile, or minor. Therefore, it was necessary for Shmuel to state that this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar and is discussing a case where the essential part of the bill of divorce was left empty.
וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן בְּהַהִיא, הָהִיא נָמֵי אִיכָּא לְאוֹקֹמַהּ כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר; אֲבָל הָא, אֵימָא מִדְּסֵיפָא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הָוֵי – רֵישָׁא לָאו רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר; צְרִיכָא.
And if he had taught us with regard to that mishna (22b), then it would be possible to say: That mishna can also be interpreted in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, as it is explained that the mishna is referring to the writing of the standard portion, but with regard to this mishna here, say: Since the last clause is explicitly attributed to Rabbi Elazar, the first clause must not be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. Therefore, it was necessary for Shmuel to note that each of three mishnayot is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar.
מִפְּנֵי הַתַּקָּנָה: מַאי תַּקָּנָה? אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן: מִפְּנֵי תַּקָּנַת סוֹפֵר; וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: עֵדֵי מְסִירָה כָּרְתִי; וּבְדִין הוּא דַּאֲפִילּוּ טוֹפֶס נָמֵי לָא לִכְתּוֹב, וּמִשּׁוּם תַּקָּנַת סוֹפְרִים שָׁרוּ רַבָּנַן.
The mishna teaches that the scribe may write the standard part of the document in advance, leaving empty the essential part, due to the ordinance. The Gemara asks: To what ordinance is the mishna referring? Rabbi Yonatan says: Due to the ordinance for the benefit of a scribe, i.e., to enable a scribe to write the standard part of a document in advance so that when a customer arrives he will not need to write the document hurriedly. And it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says: Witnesses of the transmission of the bill of divorce effect the divorce. And according to Rabbi Elazar’s opinion, by right it should have been that the scribe would not write even the standard part of the document in advance, as that part must also be written for her sake, but due to the ordinance for the benefit of scribes, the Sages permitted it.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה פּוֹסֵל בְּכוּלָּן – גָּזַר טוֹפֶס אַטּוּ תּוֹרֶף, גָּזַר שְׁטָרוֹת אַטּוּ גִּיטִּין.
The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yehuda invalidates all of these documents, not only bills of divorce, even if only their standard parts were written in advance. The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yehuda decreed that one may not write the standard part of a document in advance due to the concern lest the scribes eventually come to write the essential part of a document [toref ] in advance as well. Similarly, he decreed that this halakha applies to all documents, which need not be written for anyone’s sake, due to bills of divorce.
וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר מַכְשִׁיר בְּכוּלָּן חוּץ מִגִּיטֵּי נָשִׁים – טוֹפֶס אַטּוּ תּוֹרֶף גָּזַר, שְׁטָרוֹת אַטּוּ גִּיטִּין לָא גָּזַר.
The mishna continues: And Rabbi Elazar deems all of them valid except for bills of divorce. The Gemara explains his reasoning: Rabbi Elazar decreed that one may not write the standard part of a document in advance due to the concern lest the scribes eventually come to write the essential part of the document in advance. However, he did not decree that this halakha applies to all documents, which need not be written for anyone’s sake, due to bills of divorce.
שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״וְכָתַב לָהּ״: וְהָא כִּי כְּתִיב ״לָהּ״ – אַתּוֹרֶף הוּא דִּכְתִיב!
The mishna teaches that Rabbi Elazar invalidates bills of divorce when the standard part of the document was written in advance, as it is stated in the Torah: “And he writes for her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), which teaches that it must be written for her sake. The Gemara asks: But when it is written: “And he writes for her,” it is about the essential part of a document that it is written, and not about the standard part.
אֶלָּא אֵימָא: מִשּׁוּם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״וְכָתַב לָהּ״ – לִשְׁמָהּ.
The Gemara answers: Rather, say that Rabbi Elazar invalidates bills of divorce when the standard part of the bill of divorce is written in advance because it is stated with regard to the essential part of the bill of divorce: “And he writes for her,” which teaches that it must be written for her sake. In other words, Rabbi Elazar decrees that even the standard part of the document must be written for her sake, due to the fact that the Torah delineates this requirement with regard to the essential part of the bill of divorce.
26b
קַשְׁיָא דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אַדְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר! תְּרֵי תַּנָּאֵי וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר.
The Gemara asks: If the first clause of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, this is difficult, as there is a contradiction between the explicit statement of Rabbi Elazar in the last clause of the mishna, where he rules that a scribe may not write the standard part of a bill of divorce in advance, and the statement of Rabbi Elazar in the first clause of the mishna that a scribe may write the standard part of a bill of divorce in advance. The Gemara answers: There are two tanna’im, and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar.
רַבִּי שַׁבְּתַי אָמַר חִזְקִיָּה: מִשּׁוּם קְטָטָה; וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: עֵדֵי חֲתִימָה כָּרְתִי,
The Gemara returns to discussing the ordinance mentioned in the mishna. Rabbi Shabbetai says that Ḥizkiyya says: The ordinance mentioned in the mishna was not instituted for the benefit of scribes, allowing them to prepare the standard part of bills of divorce in advance. The ordinance was instituted due to the desire to prevent a quarrel, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says: Signatory witnesses on the bill of divorce effect the divorce, and there is no need for the bill of divorce to be written for the sake of the woman.
וּבְדִין הוּא דַּאֲפִילּוּ תּוֹרֶף נָמֵי לִכְתּוֹב; וְזִמְנִין דְּשָׁמְעָה לֵיהּ לְסוֹפֵר דְּקָא כָתֵיב, וְסָבְרָה אִיהוּ קָאָמַר לֵיהּ, וְהָוֵה לַהּ קְטָטָה בַּהֲדֵיהּ.
He continues to explain the ordinance: And by right it should have been that the scribe would be permitted to write even the essential part of the bill of divorce as well. But sometimes there might be a wife who hears the scribe who by chance is writing in advance a bill of divorce with her name, and she thinks that her husband told him to write the bill of divorce on his behalf, and she will have a quarrel with him. Therefore, the Sages instituted an ordinance that the scribe may not write the essential part of the bill of divorce in advance, as it includes the names of the husband and the wife.
רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר אֲבִימִי: מִשּׁוּם תַּקָּנַת עֲגוּנוֹת; אָמְרִי לַהּ רַבִּי מֵאִיר, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר.
The Gemara suggests another understanding of the ordinance mentioned in the mishna. Rav Ḥisda said that Avimi said: The reason for the ordinance is due to the desire to provide a remedy for deserted wives. How so? Some say that he explained the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and some say that he explained it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar.
אָמְרִי לַהּ רַבִּי מֵאִיר – דְּאָמַר: עֵדֵי חֲתִימָה כָּרְתִי, וּבְדִין הוּא דַּאֲפִילּוּ תּוֹרֶף נָמֵי לִכְתּוֹב; וְזִמְנִין דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ קְטָטָה בַּהֲדַהּ, וְרָתַח עֲלַהּ וְזָרֵיק לֵיהּ נִיהֲלַהּ, וּמְעַגֵּן וּמוֹתֵיב לַהּ.
The Gemara clarifies: Some say that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said: Signatory witnesses on the bill of divorce effect the divorce; and by right it should have been that the scribe would be permitted to write, in advance, even the essential part of the bill of divorce as well. But sometimes there could be a situation when the husband has a quarrel with his wife and becomes angry with her, and he might throw the bill of divorce to her and desert her and leave her divorced because he possessed a bill of divorce that had been prepared in advance. The Sages therefore instituted that a complete bill of divorce may not be prepared in advance to ensure that it would take time for the husband to obtain one, in the hope that he would calm down in the interim and reconsider.
אָמְרִי לַהּ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר – דְּאָמַר: עֵידֵי מְסִירָה כָּרְתִי, וּבְדִין הוּא דַּאֲפִילּוּ טוֹפֶס נָמֵי לָא לִכְתּוֹב; וְזִמְנִין דְּבָעֵי לְמֵיזַל לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם וְלָא אַשְׁכַּח סָפְרָא, וְשָׁבֵיק לַהּ וְאָזֵיל, וּמְעַגֵּן וּמוֹתֵיב לַהּ.
Some say that he explains the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who said: Witnesses of the transmission of the bill of divorce effect the divorce; and by right it should have been that scribes would not be permitted to write in advance even the standard part of the bill of divorce as well, due to a decree lest they come to write the essential part in advance. But sometimes the husband needs to travel to a country overseas, and he will not find a scribe who can write the bill of divorce for him, and he will abandon her and go and desert her and leave her in this position. The Sages instituted that scribes may write the standard part of the bill of divorce in advance, so that they can finish it quickly by simply adding the essential part.
וּמְקוֹם הַזְּמַן: קָפָסֵיק וְתָנֵי; לָא שְׁנָא מִן הַנִּישּׂוּאִין, וְלָא שְׁנָא מִן הָאֵירוּסִין.
§ The mishna teaches that the scribe must leave a place for the names and a place for the date. The Gemara comments: The tanna categorically teaches this halakha; it is no different if the divorce is from the state of marriage, and it is no different if the divorce is from the state of betrothal.
בִּשְׁלָמָא מִן הַנִּישּׂוּאִין; בֵּין לְמַאן דְּאָמַר מִשּׁוּם בַּת אֲחוֹתוֹ – אִיכָּא, בֵּין לְמַאן דְּאָמַר מִשּׁוּם פֵּירֵי – אִיכָּא;
The Gemara clarifies: Granted, in the case of a divorce from the state of marriage, it is understood why the bill of divorce must be dated. Whether according to the one who said that the reason for writing the date on a bill of divorce is due to a situation where one marries the daughter of his sister, to prevent the husband from protecting her if she commits adultery by giving her an undated bill of divorce and claiming that they had been divorced before she committed adultery with the other man, there is a reason to record the date, or whether according to the one who said that it is due to a concern for her produce, to enable her to collect the produce of her usufruct property from the moment they are divorced, there is a reason to record the date.
אֶלָּא מִן הָאֵירוּסִין; בִּשְׁלָמָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר מִשּׁוּם בַּת אֲחוֹתוֹ – אִיכָּא, אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר מִשּׁוּם פֵּירֵי, אֲרוּסָה מִי אִית לַהּ פֵּירֵי?!
But in the case of a divorce from the state of betrothal, granted, according to the one who said that the date is written on a bill of divorce due to a situation where one marries the daughter of his sister, there is the same concern where she is divorced after being betrothed, as the halakhot of adultery take effect from the time of betrothal. But according to the one who said that it is due to a concern for her produce, does a betrothed woman have produce? In any case, the husband has a right to use his wife’s property only after they are married. Therefore, it is not necessary to protect her rights by dating the bill of divorce to show when the husband’s rights to her property terminate.
אָמַר רַב עַמְרָם: הָא מִילְּתָא שְׁמַעִית מִינֵּיהּ דְּעוּלָּא דְּאָמַר מִשּׁוּם תַּקָּנַת וָלָד, וְלָא יָדַעְנָא מַאי נִיהוּ. כֵּיוָן דְּשַׁמְעִיתַהּ לְהָא דְּתַנְיָא: הָאוֹמֵר: ״כִּתְבוּ גֵּט לַאֲרוּסָתִי, לִכְשֶׁאֶכְנְסֶנָּה אֲגָרְשֶׁנָּה״, אֵינוֹ גֵּט. וְאָמַר עוּלָּא: מָה טַעַם? גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יֹאמְרוּ: גִּיטָּהּ קוֹדֵם לִבְנָהּ. הָכָא נָמֵי – גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יֹאמְרוּ: גִּיטָּהּ קוֹדֵם לִבְנָהּ.
Rav Amram said: I heard this matter from Ulla, who said that the date is written on the bill of divorce for the benefit of the child, and I did not know what this benefit is. Once I heard that which is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who says: Write a bill of divorce for my betrothed, as when I will bring her in to my home in marriage I will divorce her with it, it is not a valid bill of divorce. And Ulla said: What is the reason that it is not a valid bill of divorce? Since once he marries her she may become pregnant, there is a rabbinic decree due to the concern lest they say that receipt of her bill of divorce precedes conception of her son, as it was written while they were betrothed. Here too, the reason the scribe must leave the place of the date in a bill of divorce for a betrothed woman is that the husband may marry her before divorcing her, and there is a rabbinic decree due to the concern lest they say that receipt of her bill of divorce precedes conception of her son.
אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא, אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא בַּר שֵׁילָא, אָמַר רַב הַמְנוּנָא סָבָא, אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה, אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר. קָרֵי רַב עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: טוּבְיָנָא דְּחַכִּימֵי.
§ Rabbi Zeira says that Rabbi Abba bar Sheila says that Rav Hamnuna Sava says that Rav Adda bar Ahava says that Rav says: The halakha with regard to writing the standard portion of the bill of divorce in advance is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar that such a bill of divorce is invalid. Upon hearing this ruling, Rav proclaimed about Rabbi Elazar: He is the most gratified of the Sages, as the halakha is in accordance with his opinion.
וַאֲפִילּוּ בִּשְׁאָר שְׁטָרוֹת נָמֵי?! וְהָאָמַר רַב פַּפִּי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: הַאי אַשַּׁרְתָּא דְּדַיָּינֵי, דְּמִיכַּתְבָה מִקַּמֵּי דְּלִיסָהֲדֵי סָהֲדִי אַחֲתִימַת יְדַיְיהוּ – פְּסוּלָה; אַלְמָא מִיחְזֵי כְּשִׁיקְרָא, הָכָא נָמֵי מִיחְזֵי כְּשִׁיקְרָא!
The Gemara asks: And is the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar even with regard to other documents as well, that it is permitted for scribes to write the standard portion of other documents in advance? But didn’t Rav Pappi say in the name of Rava: With regard to this ratification of judges, which serves to confirm the authenticity of a promissory note that was written before the witnesses had testified about their signatures on the promissory note, it is invalid, even if the witnesses later attested that those were their signatures. Apparently it has the appearance of falsehood, because the court ratified the document before hearing the testimony. Here too, if one writes the documents in advance, they have the appearance of a falsehood.
וְלֵיתַהּ, מִדְּרַב נַחְמָן – דְּאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן, אוֹמֵר הָיָה רַבִּי מֵאִיר: אֲפִילּוּ מְצָאוֹ בְּאַשְׁפָּה, חֲתָמוֹ וּנְתָנוֹ לָהּ – כָּשֵׁר. וַאֲפִילּוּ רַבָּנַן לָא פְּלִיגִי עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר אֶלָּא בְּגִיטֵּי נָשִׁים, דְּבָעֵינַן כְּתִיבָה לִשְׁמָהּ, אֲבָל בִּשְׁאָר שְׁטָרוֹת – לָא.
The Gemara notes: And Rav Pappi’s statement that all documents written in advance are invalid because they have the appearance of falsehood is not accepted, because of the statement of Rav Naḥman. As Rav Naḥman said: Rabbi Meir, who holds that signatory witnesses on the bill of divorce effect the divorce, would say: Even if a husband found an unsigned bill of divorce in the garbage, and he had it signed and gave it to his wife, it is valid, as he holds that the manner of the writing of the bill of divorce does not affect whether or not it is a valid bill of divorce. And even the Rabbis disagree with the opinion of Rabbi Meir only with regard to bills of divorce, as they hold that we require the writing to be for her sake; but with regard to other documents, they do not disagree.
דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אַסִּי, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: שְׁטָר שֶׁלָּוָה בּוֹ וּפְרָעוֹ – אֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר וְלֹוֶה בּוֹ, שֶׁכְּבָר נִמְחַל שִׁעְבּוּדוֹ. טַעְמָא דְּנִמְחַל שִׁעְבּוּדוֹ, אֲבָל מִשּׁוּם שִׁיקְרָא – לָא חָיְישִׁינַן.
The Gemara comments: The proof of this is that Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In the case of a promissory note with which one borrowed money and the borrower then repaid the debt, he may not borrow money again with it. The reason is that its lien has already been forgiven. Once the debt has been repaid, the lien resulting from the loan is no longer in force. The witnesses did not sign the document again at the time of the second loan, so the lien will not be in effect, and the loan will have the status of one by oral agreement. The Gemara infers: The reason that he cannot reuse the document is that its lien has been forgiven, so that the document is no longer accurate. But as for the fact that it has the appearance of falsehood, as it was written prior to the second loan, we are not concerned.
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