Sefaria Bava Kamma 10a-b The William Davidson Talmud (Koren - Steinsaltz) - Jerusalem Talmud Kilayim 2:3 Heinrich W. Guggenheimer, 1999-2015

 Sefaria Bava Kamma 10a-b The William Davidson Talmud (Koren - Steinsaltz) - Jerusalem Talmud Kilayim 2:3 Heinrich W. Guggenheimer, 1999-2015

Level four:

Near the weekly parsha with the haftorah both with Rashi, a chapter of Nach beginning with Joshua until the end of II Chronicles without Tehillim and start after the 'end' with Joshua again, Mishnah starting with Seder Zeraim (Agriculture) Berakhot until the end Seder Tahorot (Purity) Oktzin and start after the 'end' with Seder Zeraim (Agriculture) Berakhot, a daf from the Talmud Babylonian-Jerusalem starting from the beginning until the end and after the 'end' starting with the beginning again. Reading it very quickly every day.

About This Text

Bava Kamma

Talmud

Bava Kamma (״The First Gate״) is the first of a series of three tractates in Seder Nezikin (“Order of Damages") that deal with civil matters. Bava Kamma focuses on the laws of torts: the first six chapters mostly address damages inflicted by one’s property, while the last four chapters discuss damages inflicted by people, such as theft and injury.

Composed: Talmudic Babylon (c.450 – c.550 CE)נוצר/נערך: בבל התלמודית (450 – 550 לספירה בקירוב)

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Aramaic from The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz
Nikud (vocalization) by Dicta - the Israel Center for Text Analysis.
Punctuation: Rabbi Shimon MarylesRead More

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William Davidson Edition - English

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English from The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel SteinsaltzRead More

Source: korenpub.com

Digitization: Sefaria

License: CC-BY-NC

Revision History

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For commentary etc. (right side page under resources) click: Bava Kamma 10a with About (sefaria.org)

10a

חוֹמֶר בְּשׁוֹר מִבְּאֵשׁ, חוֹמֶר בְּאֵשׁ מִבְּשׁוֹר.

There is a stringency that applies to the category of Ox as op-posed to Fire, and conversely, there is a stringency that applies to Fire as opposed to Ox.

חוֹמֶר בְּשׁוֹר מִבְּאֵשׁ – שֶׁהַשּׁוֹר מְשַׁלֵּם כּוֹפֶר, וְחַיָּיב בִּשְׁלֹשִׁים שֶׁל עֶבֶד, נִגְמַר דִּינוֹ – אָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה, מְסָרוֹ לְחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן – חַיָּיב; מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בְּאֵשׁ. חוֹמֶר בְּאֵשׁ מִבְּשׁוֹר – שֶׁהָאֵשׁ מוּעֶדֶת מִתְּחִילָּתָהּ, מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בְּשׁוֹר.

The baraita elucidates: The stringency that applies to the category of Ox as opposed to the category of Fire is that if an ox kills a Jew the owner is liable to pay a ransom, and for killing a slave the owner is liable to pay thirty sela. Furthermore, in such a case, once the court hears the evidence and the verdict of the ox is complete and the court rules that the ox must be killed, it is prohibited to derive any benefit from the ox. And if one transfers his ox to the care of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, and it causes damage, he is liable. All of this is not so with regard to a fire. And the stringency that applies to Fire as opposed to Ox is that the one responsible for the fire is considered forewarned from its inception, which is not so with regard to an ox.

חוֹמֶר בְּאֵשׁ מִבְּבוֹר, וְחוֹמֶר בְּבוֹר מִבְּאֵשׁ.

There is a stringency that applies to the category of Fire as opposed to the category of Pit, and conversely, there is a stringency that applies to Pit as opposed to Fire.

חוֹמֶר בְּבוֹר מִבְּאֵשׁ – שֶׁתְּחִילַּת עֲשִׂיָּיתוֹ לְנֵזֶק, מְסָרוֹ לְחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן – חַיָּיב; מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בְּאֵשׁ. חוֹמֶר בְּאֵשׁ מִבְּבוֹר – שֶׁהָאֵשׁ דַּרְכָּהּ לֵילֵךְ וּלְהַזִּיק, וּמוּעֶדֶת לֶאֱכוֹל בֵּין דָּבָר הָרָאוּי לָהּ, וּבֵין דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ רָאוּי לָהּ; מָה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בְּבוֹר.

The baraita elucidates: The stringency that applies to the category of Pit as opposed to the category of Fire is that its initial formation, e.g., its digging, is done in a manner that can result in damage, and if one transfers it to the care of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor and it causes damage, one is liable. This is not so with regard to a fire. The stringency that applies to Fire as opposed to Pit is that the typical manner of a fire is to proceed and cause damage. And the one responsible for it is considered forewarned with regard to its consuming both something that is fitting for it and something that is not fitting for it, i.e., both flammable and non-flammable items. This is not so with regard to a pit.

וְלִיתְנֵי חוֹמֶר בְּשׁוֹר מִבְּבוֹר – שֶׁהַשּׁוֹר חִיֵּיב בּוֹ אֶת הַכֵּלִים, מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בְּבוֹר!

The Gemara asks: But let the baraita also teach the following additional stringency: A stringency that applies to Ox as opposed to Pit is that if the ox damages vessels, the ox’s owner is liable to pay for the vessels, which is not so with regard to a pit, which incurs liability for its owner only for damage it causes to people and to animals but not to vessels.

הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, דִּמְחַיֵּיב עַל נִזְקֵי כֵלִים בְּבוֹר.

The Gemara explains: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita taught? It is taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who deems one liable also for damage caused to vessels by his pit.

אִי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: חוֹמֶר בְּאֵשׁ מִבְּבוֹר – שֶׁהָאֵשׁ דַּרְכָּהּ לֵילֵךְ וּלְהַזִּיק, וּמוּעֶדֶ[ת] לֶאֱכוֹל בֵּין דָּבָר הָרָאוּי לָהּ וּבֵין דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ רָאוּי לָהּ, מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בְּבוֹר. ״דָּבָר הָרָאוּי לָהּ״ מַאי נִינְהוּ – עֵצִים; ״דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין רָאוּי לָהּ״ מַאי נִינְהוּ – כֵּלִים; ״מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בְּבוֹר״. אִי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה – הָא אָמְרַתְּ מְחַיֵּיב הָיָה רַבִּי יְהוּדָה עַל נִזְקֵי כֵלִים בְּבוֹר!

The Gemara challenges this: If the baraita is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, try to say and explain accordingly the latter clause, which states: The stringency that applies to Fire as opposed to Pit is that the typical manner of a fire is to proceed and cause damage. And the one responsible for it is considered forewarned with regard to its consuming both something that is fitting for it and something that is not fitting for it. This is not so with regard to a pit. The Gemara clarifies: Something that is fitting for it, what are these? Pieces of wood. Something that is not fitting for it, what are these? Vessels. And yet the baraita concludes: This is not so with regard to a pit, which indicates that liability is not incurred for damage done to vessels by one’s pit. The Gemara presents the difficulty: If the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, didn’t you say that Rabbi Yehuda deems one liable for damage caused to vessels by his pit?

אֶלָּא לְעוֹלָם רַבָּנַן הִיא, וּתְנָא וְשַׁיַּיר. מַאי שַׁיַּיר דְּהַאי שַׁיַּיר? שַׁיַּיר טָמוּן.

Rather, actually, the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and the additional stringency mentioned is true but was not mentioned because the tanna taught certain cases and omitted others. The Gemara asks: What else did he omit that makes it reasonable to assume that he omitted this? As a tanna would never omit just a single case, perforce there must be more. The Gemara explains: He also omitted the case of damage done to a concealed item. Liability is incurred for damage done to a concealed item only when it was caused through a category of damage other than fire. If it is damaged by a fire that one lit, he is exempt.

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: לְעוֹלָם רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְ״דָבָר שֶׁאֵין רָאוּי לָהּ״ לָאו לְאֵתוֹיֵי כֵּלִים, אֶלָּא לְאֵתוֹיֵי לִיחֲכָה נִירוֹ וְסִכְסְכָה אֲבָנָיו.

The Gemara suggests another explanation of the baraita: If you wish, say that actually the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and explain that the term: Something that is not fitting for it, in the baraita, does not serve to include vessels; with regard to vessels there is no distinction between Fire and Pit. Rather, it serves to include a case where a fire scorched another person’s plowed field or singed [sikhsekha] his stones, which are ways of causing damage that cannot be caused by a pit.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אָשֵׁי: לִיתְנֵי חוֹמֶר בְּשׁוֹר מִבְּבוֹר – שֶׁהַשּׁוֹר חִיֵּיב בּוֹ שׁוֹר פְּסוּלֵי הַמּוּקְדָּשִׁין, מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בְּבוֹר!

Rav Ashi objects to this suggestion: If so, let the baraita also teach the following additional stringency: A stringency that applies to Ox as opposed to Pit is that in the primary category of Ox one is liable if his ox damages another’s ox that is in the category of disqualified consecrated animals, i.e., an animal set aside to be an offering that was disqualified from use and then redeemed. He is liable despite the fact that even after being redeemed it retains a degree of sanctity. This is not so with regard to damage caused by a pit to a disqualified consecrated animal, as in that case he is not liable for the damage caused.

אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא רַבָּנַן הִיא, אַיְּידֵי דְּשַׁיַּיר הָךְ – שַׁיַּיר נָמֵי הָךְ. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, מַאי שַׁיַּיר דְּהַאי שַׁיַּיר?

Rav Ashi explains his objection: Granted, if you say that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, then since the tanna omitted that case of damage done to vessels, he also omitted this case of damage done to disqualified consecrated animals. But if you say that the baraita is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, what else did he omit that makes it reasonable to assume that he omitted this?

שַׁיַּיר דָּשׁ בְּנִירוֹ. אִי מִשּׁוּם דָּשׁ בְּנִירוֹ – לָאו שִׁיּוּרָא הוּא, דְּהָ[קָ]תָנֵא: שֶׁכֵּן דַּרְכּוֹ לֵילֵךְ וּלְהַזִּיק!

The Gemara answers: He omitted the case of an ox that intentionally trampled on a plowed field of another person in order to cause damage. Since the damage was intentional it is included in the primary category of Goring and so one is liable. This manner of causing damage cannot be done by a pit. The Gemara rejects this: If one claims that the tanna omitted the case of damage done to disqualified consecrated animals only due to the fact that he also omitted the case of an ox that intentionally trampled on a plowed field of another person, that is not a sufficient justification. The latter case is not an additional independent omission, as it is included in that which is taught in that baraita: The stringency that applies to Fire as opposed to Pit is that the typical manner of a fire is to proceed and cause damage. The fact that there is no case in the category of Pit corresponding to an ox that intentionally trampled on a plowed field is addressed by this clause.

הִכְשַׁרְתִּי בְּמִקְצָת נִזְקוֹ.

§ The mishna states: In any case in which I facilitated part of the damage it caused, I am liable for payments of restitution for damage it caused, as if I were the one who facilitated the entire damage it caused.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הִכְשַׁרְתִּי מִקְצָת נִזְקוֹ – חַבְתִּי בְּתַשְׁלוּמֵי נִזְקוֹ כְּהֶכְשֵׁר כׇּל נִזְקוֹ. כֵּיצַד? הַחוֹפֵר בּוֹר תִּשְׁעָה, וּבָא אַחֵר וְהִשְׁלִימוֹ לַעֲשָׂרָה – הָאַחֲרוֹן חַיָּיב.

The Sages taught a baraita that elucidates the mishna’s ruling: In any case in which I facilitated part of the damage it caused, I am liable for payments of restitution for damage it caused, as if I were the one who facilitated the entire damage it caused. How so? In the case of one who digs a pit to a depth of nine handbreadths, and another person comes along and completes the digging to a depth of ten handbreadths, the depth at which a pit, according to halakha, can cause death, only the latter individual is liable for injuries and death caused by the pit. Although the pit was already able to cause injury before the second individual deepened it, since by deepening it he increased its capacity to cause damage, he becomes liable for any damage it causes.

וּדְלָא כְּרַבִּי – דְּתַנְיָא: הַחוֹפֵר בּוֹר תִּשְׁעָה, וּבָא אַחֵר וְהִשְׁלִימוֹ לַעֲשָׂרָה – אַחֲרוֹן חַיָּיב. רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: אַחַר אַחֲרוֹן לְמִיתָה, אַחַר שְׁנֵיהֶם לִנְזָקִין.

The Gemara suggests: And this is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who digs a pit to a depth of nine handbreadths, and another person comes along and completes the digging to a depth of ten handbreadths, only the latter individual is liable for both injuries and death caused by the pit. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: With regard to death caused by the pit, the responsibility is ascribed to the latter individual. With regard to damage caused by the pit, the responsibility is ascribed to the two of them.

רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: לְמִיתָה, וְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל.

Rav Pappa said: The baraita refers only to a digger’s liability for death caused by a pit, and then the ruling of the baraita is unanimous, i.e., it is in accordance with the opinions of both the first tanna and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי: לֵימָא דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי? אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: לְמִיתָה, וְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל.

There are those who say that the preceding discussion took a slightly different form: The Gemara asks: Shall we say that the baraita is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? Rav Pappa answered and said: The baraita refers only to a digger’s liability for death caused by a pit, and then the ruling of the baraita is unanimous.

מַתְקֵיף לָהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא: וְתוּ לֵיכָּא? וְהָא אִיכָּא: מָסַר שׁוֹרוֹ לַחֲמִשָּׁה בְּנֵי אָדָם, וּפָשַׁע בּוֹ אֶחָד מֵהֶן – וְהִזִּיק, חַיָּיב.

Rabbi Zeira objects to the explanation of the baraita, that the mishna is referring only to one specific case: But are there no more cases? But isn’t there the case of one who transferred his ox to five individuals in order for them to safeguard it, and one of them was negligent in his duties and the ox caused damage? Isn’t this individual liable for all the damage? This seems to be an additional example of the principle in the mishna that if one facilitated part of the damage caused, he is liable for pay-ments of restitution for the damage caused, as if he were the one who facilitated the entire damage, so the baraita should have mentioned it.

הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דִּבְלָאו אִיהוּ לָא הֲוָה מִינְּטַר, פְּשִׁיטָא דְּאִיהוּ קָעָבֵיד! אֶלָּא דִּבְלָאו אִיהוּ נָמֵי מִינְּטַר? מַאי קָעָבֵיד?

The Gemara rejects the possibility that the mishna could be referring to this case: What are the circumstances in which the negligent watchman bears full liability? If we say that without him the ox would not have been properly safeguarded because the ox was particularly strong and it took all five individuals to safeguard it, it is obvious that the negligent individual is liable for all the damage. The reason is that he alone, through his negligence, caused all the damage, not just part of it. Rather, the case must be where even without him the ox would still have been sufficiently safeguarded. The Gemara asks: But if that is the case, what did he do by not safeguarding it? It was still safeguarded without him, so he should not be liable for even part of the damage. It is apparent, then, that the mishna is not referring to this case.

מַתְקֵיף לָהּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: וְהָא אִיכָּא מַרְבֶּה בַּחֲבִילָה!

Rav Sheshet objects to the explanation of the baraita, that the mishna is referring only to one specific case: But isn’t there also the case of a fire that was left unattended by its owner and someone else augmented the fire by adding a bundle of wood to it, thereby increasing the capacity of the fire to cause damage to another’s field? Even though he only increased the fire’s capacity to damage, he is liable for any damage it causes. Seemingly, this is an additional example of the mishna’s principle that if one facilitated part of the damage caused, he is liable for payments of restitution for the damage caused, as if he were one who facilitated the entire damage, so the baraita should have mentioned it.

הֵיכִי דָּמֵי?

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: What are the circumstances?

10b

אִי דִּבְלָאו אִיהוּ לָא אָזְלָא – פְּשִׁיטָא! אֶלָּא דִּבְלָאו אִיהוּ אָזְלָא – מַאי קָא עָבֵיד?

If the fire would not have spread to another person’s field without him adding bundles the fire, it is obvious that he alone is liable for the damage because he alone did everything that led to the damage. Rather, the case must be one where the fire would have spread even without him. The Gemara asks: But if that is the case, what did he do by adding bundles of wood? The fire would have spread without him, so he did not cause even part of the damage. It is apparent, then, that the mishna is not referring to this case.

מַתְקֵיף לָהּ רַב פָּפָּא, וְהָא אִיכָּא הָא דְּתַנְיָא: חֲמִשָּׁה שֶׁיָּשְׁבוּ עַל סַפְסָל אֶחָד וְלֹא שְׁבָרוּהוּ, וּבָא אֶחָד וְיָשַׁב עָלָיו וּשְׁבָרוֹ – הָאַחֲרוֹן חַיָּיב. וְאָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: כְּגוֹן פָּפָּא בַּר אַבָּא.

Rav Pappa objects to the claim of the baraita that the mishna refers only to one specific case: But isn’t there also that which is taught in a baraita: With regard to a case in which five people were sitting on one bench [safsal] and it did not break, and then one additional person came and sat upon it and broke it with his added weight, the latter individual is liable for all the damage. And Rav Pappa said by way of clarification that this applies in a case where the last individual to sit down was as heavy as Pappa bar Abba. Since he could have potentially broken it even on his own, he had no right to use it. In this case, even though the weight of the first five individuals was presumably a contributing factor in causing the damage, since the damage was ultimately caused by the additional weight of the last individual, he is liable for all of the damage. Seemingly, this is an additional example of the mishna’s principle, and the baraita should have mentioned it.

הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דִּבְלָאו אִיהוּ לָא אִיתְּבַר – פְּשִׁיטָא. אֶלָּא דִּבְלָאו אִיהוּ נָמֵי אִיתְּבַר – מַאי קָעָבֵיד?

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: What are the circumstances? If we say that without him the bench would never have broken under the weight of the first five people, then it is obvious that the last individual is liable for all the damage, as ultimately it was his action alone that caused the damage. Rather, it must be that even without him the bench would have broken under the weight of the first five people, and the last individual sat down just as it was about to break. The Gemara asks: But if that is the case, what did he do, i.e., why should he be liable at all? It is apparent, then, that the mishna is not referring to this case.

סוֹף סוֹף, מַתְנִיתָא הֵיכָא מִתָּרְצָא?

The Gemara asks: Ultimately, how is the baraita cited by Rav Pappa to be explained? As the Gemara explained, the ruling of the baraita is understandable only if it is referring to a case where the bench would not have broken without him. But if that is the case, as the Gemara noted, it is obvious and therefore unnecessary to state it.

לָא צְרִיכָא; דִּבְלָאו אִיהוּ הָוֵי מִיתְּבַר בִּתְרֵי שָׁעֵי, וְהַשְׁתָּא אִיתְּבַר בַּחֲדָא שָׁעָה; דְּאָמְרִי לֵיהּ: אִי לָאו אַתְּ – הָוֵי יָתְבִינַן טְפֵי פּוּרְתָּא, וְקָיְימִין.

The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary in a case where without him it would have broken in two hours, and now it broke in one hour. The baraita teaches that the last individual alone is liable and not the first five, as they can say to the last individual: Were it not for you, we would have sat a little bit more and then stood up; consequently, the bench would never have broken. Therefore, it was ultimately you who caused the bench to break, and therefore only you are liable.

וְלֵימָא לְהוּ: אִי לָאו אַתּוּן – בְּדִידִי לָא הֲוָה מִיתְּבַר!

The Gemara rejects this suggestion, because in that situation the last individual would have a valid counterclaim: But let him say to them: Were it not for you continuing to sit on the bench after I sat down, the bench would not have broken, as under my weight alone it would not have broken. Accordingly, we should share the liability for damaging it.

לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּבַהֲדֵי דְּסָמֵיךְ בְּהוּ, תְּבַר.

The Gemara offers a different suggestion: No, it is necessary in a case where instantaneously, as he was leaning upon the other five people, the bench broke.

פְּשִׁיטָא!

The Gemara asks: If so, it is obvious that he alone is liable, as his action alone caused the damage, and the other five could not have done anything to prevent it as he was leaning upon them.

מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא, כֹּחוֹ – לָאו כְּגוּפוֹ דָּמֵי; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּכֹחוֹ כְּגוּפוֹ דָּמֵי, דְּכֹל הֵיכָא דְּגוּפוֹ תָּבַר – כֹּחוֹ נָמֵי תָּבַר.

The Gemara explains: The ruling is necessary lest you say that when one causes damage with one’s direct force it is not equivalent to a situation where one causes damage with one’s body. If he broke the bench by actually sitting down upon it, his action would be considered a direct act of damage completed with his body and he alone would be liable even though the other peoples’ weight was a contributing factor. In this case, since he broke the bench by merely leaning upon the others sitting there, it is his force that led to the damage, not his body, and one might have thought that since the weight of the others certainly contributed to the breakage they should share liability. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that causing damage with one’s direct force is equivalent to causing damage with one’s body. And it teaches that the halakha is that anywhere that one would be liable if his body broke something, one is also liable if his force broke something.

וְתוּ לֵיכָּא? וְהָא אִיכָּא הָא דְּתַנְיָא: הִכּוּהוּ עֲשָׂרָה בְּנֵי אָדָם בְּעֶשֶׂר מַקְלוֹת, בֵּין בְּבַת אַחַת בֵּין בָּזֶה אַחַר זֶה, וָמֵת – כּוּלָּן פְּטוּרִין. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתֵירָא אוֹמֵר: בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה – הָאַחֲרוֹן חַיָּיב, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁקֵּירַב אֶת מִיתָתוֹ!

The Gemara continues to consider the possibility that there are additional cases covered by the mishna’s ruling aside from the one listed in the baraita: And are there not more cases? But isn’t there also the case of that which is taught in a baraita: If one was beaten by ten people with ten sticks, whether they beat him simultaneously or one after the other, and he died, they are all exempt from liability for killing him. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: Where they beat him sequentially, the last individual to beat him alone is liable, because he hastened his death. In this case, the other individuals contributed to the man’s death, but the last one alone is liable. Why didn’t the baraita also mention this case?

בִּקְטָלָא לָא קָמַיְירֵי.

The Gemara explains: The baraita is not speaking of one’s liability to receive the death penalty, only of one’s liability to pay damages.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: בִּפְלוּגְתָּא לָא קָמַיְירֵי. וְלָא?! וְהָא אוֹקֵימְנַן דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי! דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי – וּכְרַבָּנַן, מוֹקְמִינַן; כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתֵירָא – וְלָא כְּרַבָּנַן, לָא מוֹקְמִינַן.

And if you wish, say instead that the baraita is not speaking of an issue that is the subject of a dispute. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it? But didn’t we uphold that the case stated in the baraita concerning a pit is subject to a dispute, and it is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, but of the Rabbis? The Gemara explains: We will interpret the baraita to be in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis and not to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, but we will not interpret it to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira and not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. In other words, although we will interpret the baraita as referring to a case that is subject to a dispute, that applies only if it is in accordance with the majority opinion in that dispute.

חַבְתִּי בְּתַשְׁלוּמֵי נִזְקוֹ. ״חַבְתִּי בְּנִזְקוֹ״ לָא קָתָנֵי, אֶלָּא ״בְּתַשְׁלוּמֵי נִזְקוֹ״,

§ The mishna teaches: In any case in which I facilitated part of the damage it caused, I am liable for payments of restitution for damage it caused, as if I were the one who facilitated the entire damage. The Gemara notes that the mishna does not teach: I am liable for the damage it caused, rather: I am liable for payments of restitution for damage it caused. The Hebrew terms: Payments of restitution [tashlumim], and: To complete [lehashlim], share the same Hebrew root. This alludes to the halakha that the payment of damages is required only in order to complete the injured party’s compensation, which is already partially accounted for, as the injured party is able to recover his dead animal’s current value by selling its carcass. Accordingly, the one liable for the damage is not required to pay the animal’s prior value; rather, he must pay only the difference in its value from before it was damaged and its current state.

תְּנֵינָא לְהָא דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: תַּשְׁלוּמֵי נֶזֶק – מְלַמֵּד שֶׁהַבְּעָלִים מִטַּפְּלִין בַּנְּבֵילָה.

The Gemara notes: We already learned this, as the Sages taught in a baraita: The mishna uses the term: Payments of restitution for damage, as opposed to simply stating: One is liable for the damage caused, to allude to the halakha that the one who is liable must pay only for the decrease in the value of the animal. This assumes that the injured party is able to recover his animal’s current value by selling the carcass. Therefore, the mishna teaches that the owner of the injured animal attends to, i.e., retains ownership of, the animal carcass so that, if he wishes to, he may sell it and keep the proceeds.

מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״מַכֵּה נֶפֶשׁ בְּהֵמָה, יְשַׁלְּמֶנָּה״ – אַל תִּקְרֵי ״יְשַׁלְּמֶנָּה״, אֶלָּא ״יַשְׁלִימֶנָּה״.

The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rabbi Ami said: As the verse states: “One who strikes an animal shall pay for it [yeshallemenna]” (Leviticus 24:18). Do not read the final word yeshallemenna, meaning he shall pay for it; rather, read it as though it were vocalized as yashlimenna, meaning he shall complete it, to teach that he shall complete the injured party’s compensation, which is already partially accounted for by the injured party’s right to sell his animal’s carcass.

רַב כָּהֲנָא אָמַר, מֵהָכָא: ״אִם טָרֹף יִטָּרֵף יְבִאֵהוּ עֵד, הַטְּרֵפָה לֹא יְשַׁלֵּם״ – ״עַד טְרֵפָה יְשַׁלֵּם״, טְרֵפָה עַצְמָהּ לֹא יְשַׁלֵּם.

Rav Kahana said that this halakha is derived from here: The verse states with regard to a case where an animal was entrusted with a paid bailee who did not fulfill his duty to safeguard it, and the animal was attacked by a wild beast: “If it be torn in pieces, let him bring a witness, the torn animal he shall not pay” (Exodus 22:12). Rav Kahana expounds the verse to mean that he shall pay only up until the value of the torn animal; but he shall not pay for the torn animal itself. In other words, he pays only the difference in value between the animal before it was injured and its current torn state. If the owner of the injured animal wishes to fully recover his loss he must sell the animal’s carcass and keep the proceeds.

חִזְקִיָּה אָמַר, מֵהָכָא: ״וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לוֹ״ – לַנִּיזָּק.

Ḥizkiyya said that this halakha is derived from here: The verse states with regard to a person’s ox that fatally gored another ox: “He shall pay an ox for the ox, and the carcass shall be his” (Exodus 21:36), meaning the carcass belongs to the injured party, the owner of the gored animal.

וְכֵן תָּנָא דְּבֵי חִזְקִיָּה: ״וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לוֹ״ – לַנִּיזָּק. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר לַנִּיזָּק, אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא לַמַּזִּיק? אָמַרְתָּ: לֹא כָּךְ הָיָה.

And similarly, the school of Ḥizkiyya taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And the carcass shall be his” (Exodus 21:36). The verse means the carcass belongs to the injured party. Do you say it belongs to the injured party? Or perhaps it belongs only to the one liable for the damage? To this suggestion, you should say: It could not have been that.

מַאי ״לֹא כָּךְ הָיָה״?

The Gemara asks: What does the baraita mean by: It could not have been that?

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ נְבֵילָה דְּמַזִּיק הָוְיָא, לִיכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא ״שׁוֹר תַּחַת הַשּׁוֹר״, וְלִישְׁתּוֹק; ״וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לוֹ״ לְמָה לִי? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ – לַנִּיזָּק.

Abaye said: If it enters your mind to say that the animal carcass is the property of the one liable for the damage, let the Merciful One write: “He shall pay an ox for the ox,” and then be silent and state no more. Why do I need the verse to continue: “And the carcass shall be his”? Conclude from it that the carcass belongs to the injured party.

וּצְרִיכָא; דְּאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״מַכֵּה בְּהֵמָה יְשַׁלְּמֶנָּה״ – מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא שְׁכִיחָא; אֲבָל טְרֵפָה, דִּשְׁכִיחָא – אֵימָא לָא; צְרִיכָא.

The Gemara notes: And it is necessary to have multiple sources for this halakha, as if the Merciful One wrote only: “One who strikes an animal shall pay for it,” I could claim that only in that case does one have to pay for only part of the damage because it is an uncommon occurrence. But in the case of a torn animal, which is a common occurrence, I will say that his liability should not be limited to the difference in value between what the animal had been worth and the carcass, but he should pay for the entire value of the injured animal. Therefore, it is necessary to explicitly state the halakha also in that case.

וְאִי אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן טְרֵפָה – מִשּׁוּם דְּמִמֵּילָא; אֲבָל מַכֵּה בְּהֵמָה, דִּבְיָדַיִם – אֵימָא לָא.

And if the Torah had taught us only the case of a torn animal, I could claim that only in that case does one have to pay for only part of the damage because the damage occurred by itself, i.e., it was not directly caused by the one liable for it. But in the case of one who strikes an animal, who does so by direct action, I will say that his liability should not be limited. Therefore, it is necessary to explicitly state the halakha also in that case.

וְאִי אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן הָנֵי תַּרְתֵּי – הָא מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא שְׁכִיחָא, וְהָא מִשּׁוּם דְּמִמֵּילָא; אֲבָל ״וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לוֹ״ – דִּשְׁכִיחָא וּבְיָדַיִם, אֵימָא לָא.

And if the Torah had taught us only these two cases, I could claim that only in those cases does one have to pay for only part of the damage, this one because it is an uncommon occurrence, and that one because the damage occurred by itself. But in a case where one’s ox gores another’s ox, of which the Torah states: “And the carcass shall be his,” which is a common occurrence, and the damage is considered to have been inflicted by its owner’s direct action, since it was under his guard, I will say his liability should not be limited.

וְאִי אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן ״הַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לוֹ״ – מִשּׁוּם דְּמָמוֹנָא קָא מַזֵּיק; אֲבָל הָכָא, דִּבְגוּפָא מַזֵּיק – אֵימָא לָא, צְרִיכָא.

And if the Torah had taught us only the case in the verse “And the carcass shall be his,” I could claim that only in that case does one have to pay for only part of the damage because it is one’s property that causes damage. But here, in the case of one who strikes another’s animal, where one causes damage with one’s own body, I will say his liability should not be limited. Therefore, it is necessary to explicitly state the halakha in each case.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב כָּהֲנָא לְרַב: אֶלָּא טַעְמָא דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לוֹ״, הָא לָאו הָכִי הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: נְבֵילָה – דְּמַזִּיק הָוְיָא?

Rav Kahana said to Rav: But according to the statement of Ḥizkiyya, as explained by Abaye, the only reason the injured party retains ownership of the carcass is that the Merciful One wrote: “And the carcass shall be his,” but were it not for that I would say that the carcass is the property of the one liable for the damage.

הַשְׁתָּא אִי אִית לֵיהּ לְדִידֵיהּ כַּמָּה טְרֵיפוֹת – יָהֵיב לֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר מָר: ״יָשִׁיב״ – לְרַבּוֹת שָׁוֶה כֶּסֶף, וַאֲפִילּוּ סוּבִּין; דִּידֵיהּ מִבַּעְיָא?!

Rav Kahana questions the need for the Torah to teach this: Now, if the one liable for the damage had in his possession the carcasses of several torn animals, he could give the injured party a carcass as payment, as the Master said above (7a): The verse states: “He shall recompense” (Exodus 21:34), to include items worth money, and even bran, a relatively inferior commodity, as valid items with which to pay restitution. Is it necessary for the Torah to teach that he can pay restitution with his, i.e., the injured party’s, animal carcass? Granting ownership of the carcass to the injured party seems pointless, because even had the Torah granted it to the one liable for the damage, he could give it to the injured party as payment.

לֹא נִצְרְכָא אֶלָּא לִפְחַת נְבֵילָה.

The Gemara explains: It is necessary only for the issue of who sustains the loss due to the diminishing value of the carcass between its death and when the case is brought before the court. By granting ownership of the carcass to the injured party from the moment of the animal’s death, the Torah limits the damages to the difference between the value of the animal when it was alive and its value immediately after it is killed, irrespective of what happens to the carcass afterward.

לֵימָא פְּחַת נְבֵילָה תַּנָּאֵי הִיא? דְּתַנְיָא: ״אִם טָרֹף יִטָּרֵף יְבִיאֵהוּ עֵד״ –

The Gemara asks: Shall we say that the issue of the diminishing value of the carcass is a dispute between tanna’im? As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to a case where an animal was entrusted with a paid bailee and was attacked by a wild beast: “If it be torn in pieces, let him bring a witness [ed]” (Exodus 22:12).

Jerusalem Talmud Kilayim 2:3

Heinrich W. Guggenheimer, 1999-2015

About This Text

Jerusalem Talmud Kilayim

Talmud

Kilayim (“Mixtures”) is a tractate in Seder Zeraim (“Order of Seeds”) that discusses biblical prohibitions of mixed species, based in Leviticus 19:19 and Deuteronomy 22:9-11. These include planting certain mixtures of seeds, grafting different species of trees, growing plants other than grapevines in a vineyard, crossbreeding animals, working certain animals together, and mixing wool and linen in clothing.

Composed: Talmudic Israel (c.375 – c.425 CE)נוצר/נערך: ישראל התלמודית (375 – 425 לספירה בקירוב)

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The Jerusalem Talmud, edition by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015

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The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015

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Source: nli.org.il

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For commentary etc. (right side page under resources) click: Jerusalem Talmud Kilayim 2:3:1 with About (sefaria.org)

2:3

משנה: זְרוּעָה וְנִמְלַךְ לִיטְעָהּ לֹא יֹאמַר אֶטַּע וְאַחַר כָּךְ אוֹפֵךְ. אֶלָּא הוֹפֵךְ וְאַחַר כָּךְ נוֹטֵעַ. נְטוּעָה וְנִמְלַךְ לְזוֹרְעָהּ לֹא יֹאמַר אֶזְרַע וְאַחַר כָּךְ אַשָּׁרֵשׁ. אֶלָּא מְשָׁרֵשׁ וְאַחַר כָּךְ זוֹרֵעַ. אִם רָצָה גּוֹמֵם עַד פָּחוֹת מִטֶּפַח וְזוֹרֵעַ וְאַחַר כָּךְ מְשָׁרֵשׁ. הָֽיתָה שָׂדֵהוּ זְרוּעָה קַנֵּבִּס אוֹ לוּף לֹא יְהֵא זוֹרֵעַ וּבָא עַל גַּבֵּיהֶן שֶׁאֵינָן עוֹשִׂין אֶלָּא לִשְלֹשׁ שָׁנִים. תְּבוּאָה שֶׁעָלוּ בָהּ סְפִיחֵי אִסָּטִיס וְכֵן מָקוֹם הַגְּרָנוֹת שֶׁעָלוּ בָהֶן מִינִין הַרְבֶּה וְכֵן תִּלְתָּן שֶׁהֶעֱלָת מִינֵי עֲשָׂבִים אֵין מְחַייְבִין אוֹתוֹ לְנַכֵּשׁ. וְאִם נִיכֵּשׁ אוֹ כִיסַּח אוֹמֵר לוֹ עֲקוֹר אֶת הַכֹּל חוּץ מִמִּין אֶחָד.

MISHNAH: [If the field was] sown and he decided to plant, he should not say, I shall plant and then I shall turn over, but he shall turn over and then plant. [If it was] planted and he decided to sow, he should not say, I shall sow and then I shall uproot, but he should uproot and then sow. If he wishes, he cuts down to less than a hand-breadth, plants, and then takes out the roots.
If his field was sown with hemp or arum, one should not sow on it because they produce all of three years.
One is not required to weed grain in which there appeared aftergrowth of indigo, or the threshing floor on which many kinds are appearing, or fenugreek in which grasses appeared. But if he weeded or cut, one says to him, uproot everything except one kind.

הלכה: תַּנֵּי סוֹמְכִין עוֹמָרִין בְּצַד גְּפָנִים. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי הָדָא אָֽמְרָה שֶׁאָסוּר לִיטַּע בְּצַד קָמָה יְבֵישָׁה גֶּפֶן יָבֵשׁ. מַהוּ לִזְרֹעַ בְּצַד גְּפָנִים יְבֵשׁוֹת. נִישְׁמְעִינָהּ מִן הָדָא גֶּפֶן שֶׁיָּֽבְשָׁה אֲסוּרָה וְאֵינָהּ מְקַדֶּשֶׁת. וְאָמַר רִבִּי לָֽעְזְר דְּרִבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא דְּרִבִּי מֵאִיר אָמַר אֲפִילוּ גֶּפֶן הַצֶּמֶר אָסוּר וְאֵינוֹ מְקַדֵּשׁ.

HALAKHAH: It was stated: One may put sheaves next to dried-up vines. Rebbi Yose said, that means that one may not plant a dry vine next to dry standing grain. May one sow next to dry vines? Let us hear from the following:“A dried-up vine is forbidden but does not sanctify.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is the opinion of Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, even cotton is forbidden but does not sanctify.

הָדָא אָֽמְרָה שֶׁמוּתָּר לִזְרֹעַ בְּצַד גְּפָנִים יְבֵשׁוֹת וְאִם צָֽמְחוּ מוּתָּרוֹת לְשֶׁעָבַר וַאֲסוּרוֹת לְעָתִיד לָבוֹא. כְּהָדָא רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יְהוּדָה גָּם כְּרָמַייָא אֲמַר לְאָרִיסֵיהּ פּוּק זְרַע. מִן דִּזְרַע צָֽמְחִין. אֲמַר לֵיהּ פּוּק חֲצוֹד. מִן דַּחֲצָד אַרְטִבוּן אֲמַר לֵיהּ פּוּק סְמַךְ. רִבִּי זְעִירָא בָּעֵי עַד כְּדוֹן כְּרִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יְהוּדָה שֶׁהוּא אָמַר לְדַעַת גְּמוּרָה. שְׁאָר בְּנֵי אָדָם שֶׁאֵינָן אוֹמְרִין לְדַעַת גְּמוּרָה. חָזַר וְאָמַר אֲפִילוּ רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יְהוּדָה אֵינוֹ אוֹסֵר אֶלָּא מִפְּנֵי מַרְאִית הָעַיִן.

That means that one may sow next to dry vines and “when they produce leaves again, the past is permitted and the future prohibited.” Like that of Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah who cut down his vines and told his sharecropper, go and sow! After he had sown, they started to grow leaves. He said to him, go and cut! After he had cut, they rotted; he said to him, go and sow close up. Rebbi Zeīra asked: Is that only for Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah, for he said it in full knowledge; what about common people who do not have full knowledge? He returned and said, even Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah said it only because of the bad appearance.

תְּנַיי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ הָיוּ מְלַקְּטִין עֲשָׂבִים מִכָּל־מָקוֹם חוּץ מִשְּׂדֵה תִּלְתָּן. רִבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אָחָא בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יִצְחָק בַּר נַחְמָן כְּשֶׁזְּרָעָהּ לְעָמִיר הִיא מַתְנִיתָא. וְהָא תַנִּינָן וְכֵן תִּלְתָּן שֶׁהֶעֱלָת מִינֵי עֲשָׂבִים אֵין מְחַייְבִין אוֹתוֹ לְנַכֵּשׁ. רִבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אָחָא בְשֵׁם גַּרְמֵיהּ כְּשֶׁהֶעֱלָת לְזֶרַע. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי וְכִי לֹא בָא יְהוֹשֻׁעַ לְפָרֵשׁ אֶלָּא לְעוֹבְרֵי עֲבֵירָה. עָבַר עֲבֵירָה אָסוּר מִשּׁוּם גֶּזֶל. לֹא עָבַר עֲבֵירָה מוּתָּר מִשּׁוּם גֶּזֶל הֲוֵי לֹא שַׁנְיָא הִיא שֶׁזְּרָעָהּ לְזֶרַע הִיא שֶׁזְּרָעָהּ לְעָמִיר. וְהָתַנִּינָן וְכֵן תִּלְתָּן שֶׁהֶעֱלָה מִינֵי עֲשָׂבִים אֵין מְחַייְבִין אוֹתוֹ לְנַכֵּשׁ. אִם אֶת שֶׁדַּעְתּוֹ עֲלֵיהֶן יְחַייְבוּ אוֹתוֹ לְנַכֵּשׁ. רִבִּי אָחָא בְשֵׁם רִבִּי מִייָשָׁא רוֹצֶה הֵן בָּהֶן כְּאִלּוּ עֲקוּרִין וּמוּנָחִין לְפָנָיו. מֵעַתָּה מָצָא כִלְאַיִם בְּכֶרֶם יְהוּ אֲסוּרִין מִשּׁוּם גֶּזֶל שֶׁהוּא רוֹצֶה בָּהֶן כְּאִלּוּ עֲקוּרִין וּמוּנָחִין לְפָנָיו. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי לֹא אָמַר כֵּן אֶלָּא שֶׁבְּסוֹף הוּא רוֹצֶה בָּהֶן כְּאִלּוּ עֲקוּרִין וּמוּנָחִין לְפָנָיו. מֵעַתָּה מָצָא כִלְאַיִם בְּכֶרֶם יְהוּ אֲסוּרִין מִשּׁוּם גֶּזֶל שֶׁבְּסוֹף הוּא רוֹצֶה בָּהֶם כְּאִלּוּ עֲקוּרִין וּמוּנָחִין לְפָנָיו. כָּאן יֵשׁ לוֹ עִם מִי לְהִכָּנֵס. וְכָאן אֵין לוֹ עִם מִי לְהִכָּנֵס. רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רִבִּי מָנָא בָּעֵי הַגַּע עַצְמָךְ שֶׁהָיָה שָׁם שָׂדֶה אֲחֶרֶת שֶׁל תִּלְתָּן סְמוּכָה לוֹ הֲרֵי יֵשׁ לוֹ עִם מִי לְהִכָּנֵס. מִילֵּיהוֹן דְּרַבָּנִין פְּלִיגִין. דְּאָמַר רִבִּי זְרִיקָן בְּשֵׁם דְּבֵית רִבִּי יַנַּאי כָּל־הַסְּפִיחִין מוּתָּרִין חוּץ מִן הָעֹלִין בִּשְׂדֵה בּוּר בִּשְׂדֵה נִיר בִּשְׂדֵה כֶרֶם וְאָמַר חוּץ מִשְׂדֵה תִלְתָּן שֶׁזְּרָעָן לְזֶרַע. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי מִילְתָא דְּרִבִּי יוֹחָנָן מְסַייְעָא לִי. מַעֲשֶׂה בְּאֶחָד שֶׁלָּקַח יְרָקָה שֶׁל גִּינָּה מִן הַגּוֹי. אָתָא וְשָׁאַל לְרִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. אָמַר לֵיהּ צֵא וּלְקוֹט וּלְפִי הַשּׁוּק מְכוֹר. הוֹתִיב רִבִּי אַבָּהוּ קוֹמֵי רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְהָא תַנִּינָן וְכֵן מָקוֹם הַגְּרָנוֹת שֶׁעָלוּ בָהֶן מִינִין הַרְבֶּה. אָמַר לֵיהּ מְקוֹמוֹ מוֹכִיחַ עֲלֵיהּ שֶׁאֵינוֹ רוֹצֵה בְקִיּוּמוֹ. וְיָֽתְבִינָא כָּאן אָסוּר מִשּׁוּם גֶּזֶל וְכָאן מוּתָּר מִשּׁוּם גֶּזֶל. הֵיךְ אַתְּ מֵשִׁיבֵנִי דָּבָר שֶׁהוּא אָסוּר מִשּׁוּם גֶּזֶל עִם דָּבָר שֶׁהוּא מוּתָּר מִשּׁוּם גֶּזֶל. כְּהַהִיא דְּאָמַר רִבִּי אִימִּי עֲשִׁירִים הָיוּ בִתְשׁוּבוֹת. אוֹ ייָבֹא כְּהַהִיא דְּאָמַר רִבִּי נָסָא כְּאִינַשׁ דְּאִית בֵּיהּ תְּרֵין טַעֲמִין וְהוּא מֵתִיב חַד מִינְהוֹן.

It is a condition of Joshua that one may collect grasses everywhere except in a field of fenugreek. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman: The Mishnah deals with him who sowed for sheaves. But did we not state: “One is not required to weed … fenugreek in which grasses appeared?” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in his own name: “When it grew for seeds.” Rebbi Yose said, did Joshua come only to help sinners? If he committed a sin, it is forbidden as robbery, if he did not commit a sin it is permitted in respect to robbery. Hence, there is no difference whether he sowed for seeds or for sheaves. But did we not state: “One is not required to weed … fenugreek in which grasses appeared?” If he intends to use the grasses, one should oblige him to weed! Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Miasha: He would be happy if they were torn out and lying before him. Rebbi Yose did not say so, but in the end he approves that they should be torn out and lying before him. But then, if somebody found kilaim in a vineyard, they should be forbidden as robbery since in the end he desires that they should be torn out and lie before him! There, he has the means to bring it in, here he does not have the means to bring it in. Rav Naḥman said that Rebbi Mana asked: Think about it, if he had another field of fenugreek close by, then he has the means to bring it in! The words of the rabbis disagree, since Rebbi Zeriqan said in the name of the House of Yannai: All aftergrowth is forbidden except for that which appears on a fallow field, a field ready to be ploughed under, and a vineyard. He should have added, except for a field of fenugreek sown for the production of seeds! Rebbi Yose said, the words of Rebbi Joḥanan support me. It happened that somebody bought a garden plot of vegetables from a Gentile. He came and asked Rebbi Joḥanan, who said to him, go, harvest and sell at the going rate. Rebbi Abbahu objected before Rebbi Joḥanan: Did we not state: “or the threshing place on which many kinds are appearing?” He said to him, that place proves that he does not want them to exist. Could he not have answered, the one is like robbery, the other is permitted with respect to robbery? How can you object based on a scenario where it is forbidden as robbery to a decision in a case which is permitted with respect to robbery? It is as Rebbi Immi said, they were rich in answers. Or it is as Rebbi Nasa said, like a person who has two reasons but he answers only with one of them.

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Tehillim Ohel Yosef Yitzchak

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A must read and guiding line: To go through every step, of the 42 steps in our diaspora until we reach Eretz Yisrael, the unification of Yehuda and Ephraim, when the Jews start to build The Temple and Restoring her Temple Service. It is for all Beit Yisrael International members the way to go.

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The Messianic age will elevate the entire universe, including all the spiritual realms.

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Pirkei Avot 6:10

Dr. Joshua Kulp


חֲמִשָּׁה קִנְיָנִים קָנָה לוֹ הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא בְעוֹלָמוֹ, וְאֵלּוּ הֵן, תּוֹרָה קִנְיָן אֶחָד, שָׁמַיִם וָאָרֶץ קִנְיָן אֶחָד, אַבְרָהָם קִנְיָן אֶחָד, יִשְׂרָאֵל קִנְיָן אֶחָד, בֵּית הַמִּקְדָּשׁ קִנְיָן אֶחָד. תּוֹרָה מִנַּיִן, דִּכְתִיב (משלי ח), ה' קָנָנִי רֵאשִׁית דַּרְכּוֹ קֶדֶם מִפְעָלָיו מֵאָז. שָׁמַיִם וָאָרֶץ קִנְיָן אֶחָד מִנַּיִן, דִּכְתִיב (ישעיה סו), כֹּה אָמַר ה' הַשָּׁמַיִם כִּסְאִי וְהָאָרֶץ הֲדֹם רַגְלָי אֵי זֶה בַיִת אֲשֶׁר תִּבְנוּ לִי וְאֵי זֶה מָקוֹם מְנוּחָתִי, וְאוֹמֵר (תהלים קד) מָה רַבּוּ מַעֲשֶׂיךָ ה' כֻּלָּם בְּחָכְמָה עָשִׂיתָ מָלְאָה הָאָרֶץ קִנְיָנֶךָ. אַבְרָהָם קִנְיָן אֶחָד מִנַּיִן, דִּכְתִיב (בראשית יד), וַיְבָרְכֵהוּ וַיֹּאמַר בָּרוּךְ אַבְרָם לְאֵל עֶלְיוֹן קֹנֵה שָׁמַיִם וָאָרֶץ. יִשְׂרָאֵל קִנְיָן אֶחָד מִנַּיִן, דִּכְתִיב (שמות טו), עַד יַעֲבֹר עַמְּךָ ה' עַד יַעֲבֹר עַם זוּ קָנִיתָ, וְאוֹמֵר (תהלים טז) לִקְדוֹשִׁים אֲשֶׁר בָּאָרֶץ הֵמָּה וְאַדִּירֵי כָּל חֶפְצִי בָם. בֵּית הַמִּקְדָּשׁ קִנְיָן אֶחָד מִנַּיִן, דִּכְתִיב (שמות טו), מָכוֹן לְשִׁבְתְּךָ פָּעַלְתָּ ה' מִקְּדָשׁ ה' כּוֹנְנוּ יָדֶיךָ. וְאוֹמֵר (תהלים עח) וַיְבִיאֵם אֶל גְּבוּל קָדְשׁוֹ הַר זֶה קָנְתָה יְמִינוֹ:

Five possessions did the Holy Blessed One, set aside as his own in this world, and these are they: The Torah, one possession; Heaven and earth, another possession; Abraham, another possession; Israel, another possession; The Temple, another possession. 1a) The Torah is one possession. From where do we know this? Since it is written, “The Lord possessed (usually translated as ‘created’) me at the beginning of his course, at the first of His works of old” (Proverbs 8:22). 2a) Heaven and earth, another possession. From where do we know this? Since it is said: “Thus said the Lord: The heaven is My throne and the earth is My footstool; Where could you build a house for Me, What place could serve as My abode? (Isaiah 66:1) And it says: “How many are the things You have made, O Lord; You have made them all with wisdom; the earth is full of Your possessions” (Psalms 104:24). 3a) Abraham is another possession. From where do we know this? Since it is written: “He blessed him, saying, “Blessed by Abram of God Most High, Possessor of heaven and earth” (Genesis 15:19). 4a) Israel is another possession. From where do we know this? Since it is written: “Till Your people cross over, O Lord, Till Your people whom You have possessed” (Exodus 15:16). And it says: “As to the holy and mighty ones that are in the land, my whole desire (possession) is in them” (Psalms 16:3). 5a) The Temple is another possession. From where do we know this? Since it is said: “The sanctuary, O lord, which your hands have established” (Exodus 15:17”, And it says: “And He brought them to His holy realm, to the mountain, which His right hand had possessed” (Psalms 78:54).

 

I like to call out to all my Jewish friends:

Zechariah 8:23

 

23So said the Lord of Hosts: In those days, when ten men of all the languages of the nations shall take hold of the skirt of a Jewish man, saying, "Let us go with you, for we have heard that God is with you."		כגכֹּֽה־אָמַר֘ יְהֹוָ֣ה צְבָאוֹת֒ בַּיָּמִ֣ים הָהֵ֔מָּה אֲשֶׁ֚ר יַֽחֲזִ֙יקוּ֙ עֲשָׂרָ֣ה אֲנָשִׁ֔ים מִכֹּ֖ל לְשֹׁנ֣וֹת הַגּוֹיִ֑ם וְֽהֶחֱזִ֡יקוּ בִּכְנַף֩ אִ֨ישׁ יְהוּדִ֜י לֵאמֹ֗ר נֵֽלְכָה֙ עִמָּכֶ֔ם כִּ֥י שָׁמַ֖עְנוּ אֱלֹהִ֥ים עִמָּכֶֽם:
ten men: from the seventy nations. This equals seven hundred for each corner. For the four corners of the tallith there will be two thousand and eight hundred.		עשרה אנשים: משבעים לשון הרי שבע מאות לכל כנף וכנף הרי לד' כנפי הטלית אלפים ושמונ' מאו':

That may come in fulfillment in our days:

Our souls are bearing the ‘sparks’ (divine aspects) of Messiah.

It is forbidden to pray to bow down to any other (god), and/or messiah, and/or before any image or to lift up a human being as a god…… or to put any other (god), and/or messiah, and/or any image before or instead or between HaShem and us. ('It suf')

“The redemption will come about only through the study of the Torah. And the essential redemption depends upon the study of the Kabbalah” According to: R. ELIYAHU, THE VILNA GAON (Evven Shelemah (a ‘complete, without defect stone’) 11:3)

When Yehuda and Ephraim come to unity (again) Messiah Ben Joseph 'died' and Messiah Ben David shall be revealed and anointed by the Israeli people as the Messiah-King of Israel. As YeshaYahu is teaching:

Isa 11:9 – 16 They do no evil nor destroy in all My set-apart mountain, for the earth shall be filled with the knowledge of Adonai as the waters cover the sea.

Rashi: knowledge of the Lord: [lit.] to know the Lord.

10 And on that day, there shall be a Root of Yishai, standing as a banner to the people. Unto Him the nations shall seek, and His rest shall be esteem.

Rashi: as a banner for peoples: that peoples should raise a banner to gather to him.

11 And it shall be in that day that Adonai sets His hand again a second time to recover the remnant of His people who are left, from Ashshur and from Mitsrayim, from Pathros and from Kush, from Ěylam and from Shin‛ar, from Ḥamath and from the islands of the sea.

Rashi: a second time: Just as he acquired them from Egypt, when their redemption was absolute, without subjugation, but the redemption preceding the building of the Second Temple is not counted, since they were subjugated to Cyrus.

and from the islands of the sea: the islands of the Kittim, the Romans, the descendants of Esau.

And he shall raise a banner: Perka, perche in O.F. [i.e., the verse is literally referring to the pole upon which the banner is attached.] And it shall be for a sign to gather to him and to bring the exiles of Israel to Him as a present.

12 And He shall raise a banner for the nations, and gather the outcasts of Yisra’ěl, and assemble the dispersed of Yehuḏa from the four corners of the earth.

13 And the envy of Ephrayim shall turn aside, and the adversaries of Yehuḏa be cut off. Ephrayim shall not envy Yehuḏa, and Yehuḏa not trouble Ephrayim.

Rashi: Ephraim shall not envy Judah: The Messiah, the son of David, and the Messiah, the son of Joseph, shall not envy each other.

14 But they shall fly down upon the shoulder of the Philistines toward the west; together they plunder the people of the east, their hand stretching forth on Eḏom and Mo’aḇ, and the children of Ammon shall be subject to them.

Rashi: And they shall fly of one accord against the Philistines in the west: Heb. בְכָתֵף. Israel will fly and run of one accord against the Philistines who are in the west of Eretz Israel and conquer their land. [כָּתֵף, lit. a shoulder, is used in this case to denote unity. The word שֶׁכֶם, also lit. a shoulder, is used in a similar sense.] Comp. (Hoshea 6:9) “They murder on the way in unison (שֶׁכְמָה) ”; (Zeph. 3:9) “One accord (שְׁכֶם אֶחָד).” And so did Jonathan rendered it: And they shall join in one accord to smite the Philistines who are in the west.

and the children of Ammon shall obey them: As the Targum states: Will hearken to them. They will accept their commandments over them.

15 And Adonai shall put under the ban the tongue of the Sea of Mitsrayim, and He shall wave His hand over the River with the might of His Spirit, and shall strike it in the seven streams, and shall cause men to tread it in sandals.

Rashi: And… shall dry up: [lit. shall cut off] to dry it, so that the exiles of Israel will pass through it from Egypt.

over the river: The Euphrates River, for the exiles from Assyria to cross.

with the strength of His wind: Heb. בַּעְיָם. This is hapax legomenon in Scripture, and according to the context it can be interpreted as “with the strength of His wind.”

into seven streams: into seven segments, for the aforementioned seven exiles: from Assyria and from Egypt, etc. Those from the islands of the sea are not from that side.

and He shall lead: the exiles within it.

with shoes: on dry land.

16 And there shall be a highway for the remnant of His people, those left from Ashshur, as it was for Yisra’ěl in the day when he came up from the land of Mitsrayim.

Rashi: And there shall be a highway: in the midst of the water for the remnant of His people.

Please Judah if a righteous gentile tries ‘to grasp your ‘tsi-sit’ and say:  "Let me go with you, for I have heard that God is with you." Open your heart for him/her and share all our Torah. The Torah of Moshe Rabbeinu as it is written and spared and is teaches in the Tanach and all scripture of Rabbinical Judaism………

Read my story: 

Ariel your Representee, Representee of Ephraim and adviser (not a rabbi but friendly adviser) of Bet Yisrael international on the Har HaBayit.

click: Welcome To Beit Yisrael

Beit Yisrael International (Ephraim, The Lost sheep from the House of Israel), Meditate and Realization of Chassidut Torah Teachings – The Strong foundation is based on Chabad teachings ( i.e The purpose of creation is to Bringing Heavens Down to Earth and to make Most High a dwelling place here on earth) and its pillars is based on the true concept of the Breslov Teachings ( in the context of Seventh Pillar of Tzaddik ) by following the Jewish Halacha Principles of Shulchan Aruch Halacha.

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It should be most honest:

'Israeli MK proposes dividing Temple Mount between Jews and Muslims

**AMIT HALEVI'S PLAN WOULD GIVE MUSLIMS CONTROL OF THE SOUTHERN END OF THE TEMPLE MOUNT COMPLEX, WHICH CONTAINS THE AL-AQSA MOSQUE, WHILE JEWS WOULD RECEIVE THE CENTRAL AND NORTHERN AREAS.

(JUNE 8, 2023 / JNS)**

A Likud lawmaker is proposing a plan to divide Jerusalem’s Temple Mount between Muslims and Jews and to remove Jordan’s custodial status over the holy site.

Speaking to the Zman Yisrael Hebrew news site, Knesset member Amit Halevi outlined a plan whereby Muslims would control the southern end of the 37-acre complex which contains the Al-Aqsa mosque, while Jews would receive the central and northern area, where the Dome of the Rock sits.

According to Halevi, the reorganization makes sense from a religious point of view because that part of the Temple Mount is the holiest site in Judaism, where it is believed the First and Second Temples stood. The Foundation Stone at the center of the Dome of the Rock is where Jewish sources place the Holy of Holies.

“This is the place of the First Temple and the place of the Second Temple built by Babylonian immigrants. No one needs to examine the stones to know that it is ours,” he said.

Halevi also wants to end Israel’s agreement with the Jordanian Waqf whereby the Islamic trust controls and manages Islamic edifices on the Temple Mount.

“Why not give them status in the Dizengoff Center [a large shopping mall in Tel Aviv] as well? This is a terrible mistake. This status should be abolished. I know it’s an agreement between countries, but we have to deal with it. It requires change, even if the process will take time,” he said.

In addition, Halevi wants to give Jews the same access to the Temple Mount enjoyed by Muslims. Currently, the Waqf only allows Jews and non-Muslim tourists access to the Temple Mount via the Maghrebi Gate and only at certain hours when the gate is open.

“We will take the northern end and pray there. The entire mountain is sacred to us, and the Dome of the Rock is the place on which the Temple stood. This should be our guideline,” he said. “Israel is leading. It will be a historical, religious and national statement. If this does not happen then you are not actually the owner of the house. You are a klutz. Why are you even going in there?”

Source: https://www.jns.org/israel-news/jerusalem/23/6/8/293752/

Please let we all, Jews and all their friends, take the Har HaBayit and start building the Temple and restoring her service?

כִּ֤י אִם־הֵיטֵיב֙ תֵּיטִ֔יבוּ אֶת־דַּרְכֵיכֶ֖ם וְאֶת־מַעַלְלֵיכֶ֑ם אִם־עָשׂ֤וֹ תַֽעֲשׂוּ֙ מִשְׁפָּ֔ט בֵּ֥ין אִ֖ישׁ וּבֵ֥ין רֵעֵֽהוּ׃

No, if you really mend your ways and your actions; if you execute justice between one party and another;

גֵּ֣ר יָת֤וֹם וְאַלְמָנָה֙ לֹ֣א תַעֲשֹׁ֔קוּ וְדָ֣ם נָקִ֔י אַֽל־תִּשְׁפְּכ֖וּ בַּמָּק֣וֹם הַזֶּ֑ה וְאַחֲרֵ֨י אֱלֹהִ֧ים אֲחֵרִ֛ים לֹ֥א תֵלְכ֖וּ לְרַ֥ע לָכֶֽם׃

if you do not oppress the stranger, the orphan, and the widow; if you do not shed the blood of the innocent in this place; if you do not follow other gods, to your own hurt—

וְשִׁכַּנְתִּ֤י אֶתְכֶם֙ בַּמָּק֣וֹם הַזֶּ֔ה בָּאָ֕רֶץ אֲשֶׁ֥ר נָתַ֖תִּי לַאֲבוֹתֵיכֶ֑ם לְמִן־עוֹלָ֖ם וְעַד־עוֹלָֽם׃

then only will I let you dwell in this place, in the land that I gave to your ancestors for all time.

Ariel your Representee, Representee of Ephraim and adviser (not a rabbi but friendly adviser) of Bet Yisrael international on the Har HaBayit.

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